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INTRODUCTION

The preservation and enhancement of the natural environment is a
recognized policy goal of the United States.' Recent developments in
western water law which strive to protect fish and wildlife habitats,
recreational uses, aquatic life, as well as numerous other environmental concerns have furthered environmental protection. 2 The concern
for environmental protection of water is genuine, because as man continues to proliferate and prosper, so too do his demands on the environment.3 Without proper regulations and management he may soon
face ecological disaster. 4
If environmental policies are to be incorporated into state water
law, affirmative steps must be taken to reserve large quantities of
water for the preservation of fish and wildlife habitats.' Environ1. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
Congress has declared that the national policy should preserve productivity and enjoyable
harmony with our natural environment. See id. § 4321. Congress recognizes that as man
becomes more populous, it is important that he foster and promote the general welfare by
restoring and maintaining environmental quality. See id. § 4331.
2. See, e.g., Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water Rights
Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 695 (1972) (preservation and enhancement of environmental aspects is one of America's deep concerns); Note, Arizona Water Law: The Problem of
Instream Appropriation for Environmental Use by Private Appropriators, 21 ARIz. L. REV.
1095, 1095 (1979) (water management and its relation to natural environment is apparent);
Comment, FederalProtection ofInstream Values, 57 NEB. L. REV. 368, 368 (1978) (environmental concerns encompass preservation of both water quantity and water quality). See generally Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law,
1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 902 (value of water allocation for environmental uses is becoming
more recognized and instream uses have gained legitimacy by legislative recognition in many
western states).
3. See Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerationsin Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 695 (1972) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY at V (1970)).

As man

becomes more populous and the need for water increases, pressure is put on riparian habitats
because the demand for water and other natural resources deprives already existing ecosystems
of their necessary water supply. See id. at 695; see also Johnson, Legal Assurances ofAdequate
Flows of Fresh Water into Texas Bays and Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10
HOUS. L. REV. 598, 600 (estuarial systems of Texas are threatened by man's actions through
water pollution and diversion of water needed to maintain productive ecosystems); Note, Arizona Water Law: The Problem of Instream Appropriationfor Environmental Use by Private
Appropriators,21 ARIz. L. REV. 1095, 1095 n.3 (1980) (unregulated appropriation in Arizona
has resulted in disappearance of many former habitats);.
4. Cf National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970)
(United States Congress has recognized profound impact of man's actions on many environmental needs and has declared that it is national policy to promote and protect natural
environment).
5. See Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D.L.
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ments and ecosystems in nature are dependent on adequate flows of
water in creeks and rivers, as well as minimum levels of water in natural lakes or ponds.6 The environmental necessity of adequate water
flows is not new to Texas, and for many years, Texans have undertaken efforts to preserve the environment through regulating the use
of water.7 While the efforts to preserve Texas' ecological balance
through regulation of water use are praiseworthy, they are inadequate
in comparison to methods of protection employed by other states.8
Without immediate legislative action granting priority to environmen-

REV. 233, 233-34 (1980) (protecting ecological values, recreational opportunities and aesthetic
qualities of lakes and streams requires leaving water in place). The public has insisted on
protecting environmental concerns and has asked that courts step in and look over appropriation of limited water resources. See id. at 233-34.
6. See Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9, 12 (Idaho
1978) (adequate or minimum flows mean that flow of water in natural water courses or minimum levels of water in lakes or ponds which are required to protect "fish and wildlife habitat,
aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality therein"); see also 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1271 (1985) (Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act). The United States has recognized that
many rivers should be preserved in their "free flowing condition" in order to protect the immediate environments for the "enjoyment of present and future generations." See id. § 1271; see
also Sherton, Preserving Instream Flows in Oregon's Rivers and Streams, 11 ENvTL. L. 379, 381
n.10-11 (1981) (past water resources provided adequate water for instream, as well as consumptive uses, now values dependent on adequate streamflows are threatened). "Because of
limited supplies and increasing demands ... a water crisis is particularly evident for those uses
such as fish, recreation, and pollution abatement that rely on sustianed stream flows." Id. at
381 n. 10-11 (quoting Rousseau, The Oregon Experience with a Minimum Streamfiow Law, 2
INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS 78 (1976)).
7. See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 1.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (public policy of state
to provide for development and conservation of water in "development of its forests ... maintenance of a proper ecological environment of the bays and estuaries ...

and health ...

of

marine resources"); id. § 11.147 (public interest considerations affecting issuance of appropriation permits which effect bays and estuaries and fish and wildlife habitats); id. § 16.012(b)(5)
(executive administrator of Water Development Board is charged with duty of investigating
effects on bays and estuaries of future water facilities and reservoirs); see also TEX. PARKS &
WILDLIFE CODE ANN. §§ 25.001 to -.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (recreational uses of water are
useful purposes and conservation and development of water related lands and water resources
are public rights and duties).
8. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.247 (West Supp. 1986) (duty of water rights
agency to condition or deny future water rights permits to protect established minimum flows
and levels which department of ecology recommends is necessary for environmental preservation); compare IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (Supp. 1985) (minimum stream flow maintenance is
necessary and desirable for public benefit and authority is granted to water rights agency to
preserve such water through appropriate management of water rights permits) with TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147(e) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (water rights agency is to consider effects of permit issuance "on fish and wildlife habitats"). The legislature has failed to expressly
authorize conditioning permits on minimum stream flows and has not indicated the slightest
importance for such consideration. See id. § 11.147.
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tal concerns in the regulation of water rights, the ecological future of
Texas' fish and wildlife habitats may be jeopardized. 9

The purpose of this comment is to explore the legal justification
which could be used to protect instream flows, thus ensuring the preservation of the natural environment. The comment will also discuss
the effect of the 1985 Texas Water Package and its partial adoption of
these justifications. While the 1985 Water Package has made significant advances by expressing public interest elements representing en-

vironment concerns, 10 these advances cannot be viewed as providing
the necessary protection for Texas wildlife habitants.II Furthermore,
a proposal for a more comprehensive environmental protection policy
will be advocated in order to provide a water plan for Texas reason12
ably sensitive to protecting the environment.

9. See Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate Flows of Fresh Water into Texas Bays and
Estuaries to Maintain ProperSalinity Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 598 (1973). The increased
utilization of water throughout the state is expected to reduce instream flows to coastal areas.
See id. at 598. This reduction of fresh water will severely alter the balance of fresh versus salt
water mixed necessary for a productive environment. See id. at 598. Although many Texas'
authors focus exclusively on the bay and estuary systems, it should be recognized that other
environmental habitats may be affected by water use. Cf Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor
Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 233, 233 n.2 (1980). Professor Johnson
states:
Thousands of rivers, streams and lakes in the west are dried up completely by appropriations each year with disastrous consequences for fish and other living things which depend
on water for survival. Countless other water bodies, so depleted by diversions, either
annually or occasionally, are totally changed from their natural state and become an entirely different ecological habitat.
Id. at 233 n.2. The use of water in inland areas of Arizona has deprived that state of many of
its environmental wonderlands. See Note, Arizona Water Law.- The Problem of Instream Appropriationfor Environmental Use by Private Appropriators, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1095, 1095 n.3
(1980) (damming, channelization, diversion, and unregulated pumping have destroyed many
former habitats).
10. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The Texas Water
Commission must consider factors necessary to protect flows to Texas' bays and estuaries as
well as consider harm to fish and wildlife habitat due to appropriation permits they may issue.
See id. §§ 11.147(b),(c), (e).
11. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas Water
Commission must only consider effects of appropriations on fish and wildlife habitats) with
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020 (Supp. 1986) (fundamental consideration will be quality
of natural environment and its protection and enhancement) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a703b (1984) (all new permits subject to minimum stream flows which are set by state).
12. See Press Release of Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter at 4 (September 9, 1985) (Sierra
Club believes that new provisions in Texas Water Code affecting instream uses must be augmented to be environmentally sensitive).
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DEVELOPMENT OF INSTREAM USES IN TEXAS WATER LAW

Instream uses are defined as "non-consumptive uses of water that
are confined to the banks and bed of a stream or lake." 13 Non-consumptive uses are really the uses of water in its natural state or flow
level. 4 The non-consumptive uses or instream uses include preservation of such environmental concerns as ecosystems, fish and wildlife
habitats, recreation, and aesthetic beauty.15 Insteam uses are distinguished from consumptive uses in that they do not divert and utilize
in its natwater for a specific purpose, but actually preserve the water
16
ural state to ensure the protection of the minimal flow.
Minimum instream flows are the amount of water that flows in
water courses or the minimum level of water in lakes' 7 which preserve
13. See Tarlock & Rice, Minimum Stream Flow Maintenance, PROCEEDINGS, WATER
LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, § 9, at 1 (1985); see also Note, ProtectingStreamflows in California,8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697, 697 n.2 (1980) (instream uses are purposes for which
water is left in its natural course). Water left instream for power generation is not considered
an instream use, but is considered as offstream or other uses which generally require diversion
from natural water courses. See id, at 697 n.2.
14. See Note, ProtectingStreamflows in California, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697 n.92 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 874 (water utilization for environment includes
protection of fish and wildlife habitats and enhancement of aesthetic beauty); Note, Arizona
Water Law: The Problem of Instream Appropriationfor Environmental Use by Private Appropriators, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1095, 1107 (1979) (Arizona law has defined specific uses for unappropriated waters including purposes of preserving fish, wildlife and recreation) (citing ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-147 (1962)); Note, In-Stream Appropriationfor Recreational Use and
Scenic Beauty, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 263, 268 (1976) (recreation and scenic beauty are valid
purposes and are considered beneficial uses of water in Idaho). Other purposes or instream
uses may include more obscure uses such as the creation of a fire barrier. See Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9, 12 (Idaho 1978) (valid purpose for
protecting stream flow includes establishment and maintenance of fire barrier in national
forest).
16. See Tarlock & Rice, Minimum Stream Flow Maintenance, PROCEEDINGS, WATER
LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, § 9, at 1-2 (1985) (instream uses are recognized

for purposes of protecting stream flows in their natural state). Cf Avondale Irrigation Dist. v.
North Idaho Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9, 12 (Idaho 1978) (non-consumptive water rights
limited to extent necessary to preserve some natural flow, however, water in excess of those
amounts subject to appropriation).
17. See, e.g., Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9, 12
(Idaho 1978) (minimum stream flow is amount of water and natural flow required to preserve
fish habitat); Note, Arizona Water Law: The Problem of Instream Appropriationfor Environmental Use by Private Appropriators, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1095, 1096 n.5 (1979) (minimum instream flows incorporates two concepts of instream flow and minimum flow and underlying
purpose of both are environmental protection); Note, ProtectingStream Flows in California, 8
ECOLOGY L.Q. 697, 710 (1979) (instream flow requirements are those amounts of water necessary to preserve, restore instream uses).
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and support various ecological systems. As consumptive uses of
water increase, due to permits diverting or impounding water, instream uses are many times ignored. As a result, environments and
ecosystems which are dependent upon adequate flows could disappear
or be altered from their present state.' 8 This deterioration of the natural environment may have devastating effects not only to Texas' natural scenic beauty, but to economic concerns as well. ' 9 This potential
economic devastation is most threatening to Texas bays and estuaries
which provide millions of pounds of commercial harvests of shellfish
and fish each year. 21 In addition, water-related lands provide pleasure
and recreation to thousands of Texas citizens by providing exciting
areas for hunting and fishing.2 ' If water is allowed to be taken from
natural water courses without proper regulation and mangement, the
future of Texas natural environments dependent on adequate instream
flows may be doomed.2 2
18. See, e.g., Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerationsin Water Rights
Administration, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 696 (1972) (appropriation permits and construction of
water development projects can have significant effect on environmental concerns due to allocation of scarce water resources and environmental factors should be considered); Note, Arizona Water Law. The Problem of Instream Appropriationfor Environmental Use by Private
Appropriators, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (1979) (increase demands of consimptive water
use is beginning to abuse and destroy natural water related lands); Note, ProtectingStream
Flows in California, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697, 697 (1980) (diversions of water damages instream
uses because they reduce amounts of water required to remain instream) (citing NAT'L WATER
COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 7 (1973)).

19. See Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine. Insuring the Needs of Texas
Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 370 (1985) (Texas allows appropriation of consumptive rights in perpetuity and continued extraction of water may lead to exhaustion of
water irrespective of environmental concerns); see also Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate
Flows of Fresh Water into Texas Bays and Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10
Hous. L. REV. 598, 598 (1973) (changes, due to reduced volume of fresh water inflows in bays,
will be severely harmful to ecological productivity).
20. See Hamilton, Texas CommercialHarvests Statistics 1977-1982, at 2 (Texas Parks and
Wildlife Department, Coastal Fisheries Branch 1983). "The Texas coasts have averaged 110
million pounds - 90 million pounds of shellfish and 20 million pounds finfish.... [I]n 1981,
the commercial harvests of fish and shellfish had a dockside value of $174.8 million." See
Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 367 (1985) (commercial fishing statistics reflect only part of
economic worth of bays and estuaries since they do not include sports fishing and recreational
hunting which coast provides).
21. See Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine.: Insuring the Needs of Texas
Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1985) (sport fishing and hunting activities in coastal areas result in overall economic impact for state of $553 million).
22. See id. at 370 (doctrine of prior appropriation is on collision course in Texas with
instream uses and conflict must be resolved before future diversion severely harms environmental interests).
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HistoricalPerspective
The most crucial issue confronting any attempt to regulate the

management of water is determining the ownership or right to the use
of the water in question. 2 Originally, Texas followed the early common law doctrine of riparian water rights when determining the ownership and privileges associated with water.14 The law of riparian
rights provides that one who owns title to land that abuts a stream or

river also owns a right to use a reasonable amount of that water.25 As
the riparian rights law was developing, the doctrine of prior appropriation emerged in western territories in order to facilitate the water

needs of pioneers who came in search of gold and to settle vast arid
lands.26
Due to the importance of water in western mining operations, disputes soon arose over the right to divert water by appropriation and
23. See Note, The Plight of the Riparian Under Texas Water Law, 21 Hous. L. REV. 577,
578 (1984) (riparian land owners have certain rights to water and so do appropriators who
divert water from riparian lands for beneficial use). There is inherent conflict between the
holders of riparian and appropriative water rights under Texas law and it is important to
resolve who owns vested riparian rights in order to determine public ownership of unappropriated waters. See id. at 579.
24. See Trelease, Coordinationof Riparianand Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water,
33 TEXAS L. REV. 24, 28 (1955). Most states in the early nineteenth century welcomed the
French law of riparian rights because, in many instances due to the revoluntary war, some
American courts were forbidden to cite English authority. See id. at 28. The French law had
adopted riparian law by stating: "Celui dont la propriate borde une eau courante... peut s'en
servir a son passage pour l'irragation de ses proprietes" ("he whose property borders on a
running watercourse ... may supply himself from it in its passage for irrigation of his properties"). See Weil, Waters.- American Law and French Authority, 33 HARVARD L. REV. 133,
134 (1919) (citing Napoleon Code art. 644 (1804)).
25. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dodd, 125 Tex. 125, 128-29, 81 S.W.2d 653, 655
(1935) (riparian right incident to real estate and right given by nature). The court stated:
It has been said that the right of a riparian owner to the use of water bordering upon his
land comes from the situation of the land with respect to the water, and the presumption
that it was acquired with the view to the use and enjoyment of the natural advantages and
benefits resulting therefrom.
Id. at 129, 81 S.W.2d at 655.
26. See Trelease, Coordinationof Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water,
33 TEXAS L. REV. 24, 27 (1954) (pioneers searching for gold developed prior appropriation
law to meet their needs for water and mining). Early miners needed to govern acquisition of
mining claims and claims to water necessary to operate mills and extract gold. See id. at 27.
The California miners adopted a custom by which they recognized the rights to mining claims
and diversions of water needed to perfect or stake a claim. See Robie, Some Reflections on
Environmental Considerations in Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 696
(1972).
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the right to use water under riparian ownership.27 In rejecting the
claim of a riparian owner, the California Supreme Court upheld the
social customs of California miners and declared that the miners'
rights as prior appropriators of water should be protected. 2 As a
result, a canal owner was not permitted an undiminished flow of
water under a claim of riparian ownership which had previously been
appropriated by the miners.29 Prior appropriative rights came to be
legally recognized as those acquired by permit from the sovereign
which allow specific uses of the water without the riparian requirement of the ownership of land appurtenant to the water source. 3' The
appropriation concept was well suited for the pioneering economy of
western territories dependent on irrigation to be productive, and the
first settlor to a valley could choose any land he wished and appropriate water from the nearest stream as needed to produce crops. 3
27. See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145-46 (Cal. 1855) (California miners brought suit
against canal owner who attempted diversion of water for mining purposes as riparian owner).
The California miners claimed that water rights customs of the territory protected them
against subsequent appropriators since miners had use of the water first. See id. at 146.
28. See id. at 147. The California Legislature had adopted the English common law
which recognized the law of riparian rights, but since riparian law could not be applied since
neither party owned the land, the court was forced to look elsewhere. See Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerationsin Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695,
696 n.5 (1972). The Supreme Court of California then looked to customs with reference to
mining claims and established "appropriative rights" to water use, founded on the principle
"first in time, first in right." See id. at 697; see also Trelease, Coordinationof Riparian and
Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 24, 28 (1954) (California court
cited no precedent because none existed). The social customs had been so fixed and followed
throughout the state that they had to be protected. See id. at 28; see also Basey v. Gallagher,
87 U.S. 670, 681-82 (1874) (recognizing right to prior appropriation for irrigation purposes is
recognized in Montana and other western territories and will not be defeated by riparian
claims). The law of prior appropriation has been broadened in order to reflect social standards
not only in the mining fields of California but the farming lands of Montana as well. See id. at
682-83.
29. See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145-46 (Cal. 1855) (riparian ownership has no application to lands which belong to United States because riparian doctrine requires private ownership of land). At common law, one aspect of riparian ownership provided that the owner
could prevent any diversion of water which deprived him of pure and natural condition of
water he owned. See id. at 145-46. The miners, however, had a right to dig for gold throughout the territory and many had selected diversion points along the stream for mining purposes.
See id. at 146. Necessity and propriety of a mineral region such as California demanded that
already diverted waters must be protected and recognized as rights conferred by the United
States with those whose diversions first in time being first in right. See id. at 146-47.
30. See First State Bank v. McNew, 269 P. 56, 65 (N.M. 1928) (allows purchaser of
public land ability to take right to use water by appropriation and not as owner of real estate
appurtenant to water).
31. See Trelease, Coordinationof Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water,
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As a result of the demand for appropriation of water by western
pioneers, the federal government, in 1866, statutorially confirmed appropriative water rights by mandating their recognition as "local custom and law."' 32 As appropriation law developed, Congress passed
the Desert Land Act in 1877. 33 The Act provided for the settlement
of the desert lands throughout most of the western states by those
persons who could convert unproductive land to farm land by utilizing appropriated waters for irrigation.3 4 As a result of federal recognition of appropriative rights, the legal adoption of such rights soon
35
spread throughout the western states of North and South Dakota,
Nebraska,36 Washington,3 7 Oregon,3 8 and Oklahoma. 39
33 TEXAS L. REV. 24, 28 (1954) (location of stream was immaterial to appropriator and subsequent settlors to second choice of both land and water).
32. See Act of Congress 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§ 661 (1962)). The statute declares that all the public lands will recognize the law of prior
appropriation as they may be "acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of
court" and that the federal government will protect and maintain those righs. See 43 U.S.C.
§ 661 (1982). The scope of this statute allows a purchaser of public land the ability to take a
vested right to use water by appropriation only and not as the owner of land entitled to water

rights incident or appurtenant as a part of real estate. See First State Bank v. McNew, 269 P.
56, 65 (N.M. 1928). The United States Supreme Court has held that the statute not only
created appropriation rights, but that it recognizes pre-existing rights which the Congress confirmed by its enactment. See, e.g., Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276
(1879) (extended use of water and land improvements to effectuate that use not defeated by
government grant of land to railroad company because the statute recognized "preexisting
right of possession" to claim of water); Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 683 (1874) (statute
does not restrict the appropriators right to water, but enacted to recognize his existing rights to
use water in beneficial purpose); Atchinson v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1874) (owners of
vested rights to use water which were recognized by local laws and customs will be protected
by act of Congress in 1866).
33. See Desert Lands Act, ch. 107, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
34. See id. § 321. The statute contains the following clause:
[A]ll surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the
water of all lakes, rivers and other sources of water supplies upon the public lands and not
navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for
irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.
Id. § 321.
35. See Sturr v. Beck, 133 U.S. 541, 552 (1889). The Supreme Court upheld the application of the Territory of Dakota Statute which recognizes the validity of prior appropriation
rights. See id. at 552. The Dakota statutes were in substance the same as found in the Act of
Congress, 14 Stat. 253, § 9, as amended 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1866), in which the federal government recognized the water rights of prior appropriators in all western territories of the United
States. See id. at 550.
36. See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 93 N.W. 781, 793 (Neb. 1903) (necessary for Nebraska to recognize rights of prior appropriators at least with respect to uses in soil or agricultural purposes).
37. See Isaacs v. Barber, 38 P. 871, 873 (Wash. 1894) (recognizes the rights of prior
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Texas Development of Appropriative Rights

While still adhering to riparian rights system of water rights,"
Texas law also recognized the utility of adopting the prior appropriation concept for the use and governing of the flow of its rivers.41
Prompted by drought conditions during the late nineteenth century,
the Texas Legislature passed the Irrigation Act of 1889 which declared unappropriated waters in all arid regions to be the property of
the state, thus subjecting these waters exclusively to appropriations
granted by the state.42 The Irrigation Act had the effect of restricting
appropriators as they exist in custom or locality and to same extent as federal government has
acknowledged them); Tenim Ditch Co. v. Thorpe, 20 P. 588, 589 (Wash. 1889) (irrigator had
vested rights to appropriated water upon public lands owned by United States as part of Washington Territory).
38. See Carson v. Gentner, 52 P. 506, 507 (Ore. 1898) (at least to the extent that federal
government has acknowledged appropriative rights, State of Oregon will uphold customs of
appropriating water on government lands).
39. See Gates v. Settlers' Milling, Canal & Reservoir Co., 91 P. 856, 856 (Okla. 1907)
(Oklahoma, although blessed with moisture, allows diversion and appropriation of water based
on priority of right at least with respect to arid regions).
40. See Haas v. Choussard, 17 Tex. 588, 590 (1856) (court allowed plaintiff to recover
damages due to defendants damming and unhealthy backlog of water onto plaintiff's abutting
land). The court stated that:
[Plaintiff] had a right to the use of the water adjacent to his lots, as it flowed in its natural
channel; a right inherent to and inseparably connected with the land itself."
Id. at 590.
41. See In re Adjudication of Water Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segment of Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Tex. 1982) (generally legislature considered ordinary flow
of rivers subject to legislative appropriation) (citing Walker, Legal History of the Riparian
Right of Irrigationin Texas Since 1836, PROCEEDINGS, WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, 41, 47 (1959)).
42. See Irrigation Act of 1889, 1888 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 88, at 100, 9 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 1128 (1898), amended by Irrigation Act of 1895, Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 21, at

21, 10 H.

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS

751 (1898) ("storm and flood" waters as well as other

public water subject to appropriation if they will not affect vested riparian water rights owners); see also In re Adjudication of Water Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segment of Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. 1982) (severe drought began in Texas in 1883 and
Governor Ross called on 21st Legislature to adopt Irrigation Act). Texas needed to adopt
prior appropriation system of water rights and Governor Lawrence S. Ross made this clear in
his address to the legislature in 1889. See id. at 440 n.2; see also Mot] v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 9091, 286 S.W. 458, 463 (1926) (Texas recognized law of appropriative rights with respect to
public lands before legislature enacted the Water Appropriations Act of 1889). The Water
Appropriations Act of 1889 was the first legislation to authorize appropriation of "storm and
flood waters" and any other waters, appropriation of which would not affect riparian rights.
See id. at 124, 286 S.W. at 474; see also, Irrigation Act of 1889, 1888 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 88,

at 100, 9 H.

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS

1128 (1898), amended by Irrigation Act of 1895, 1895

Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 21, at 21, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 751 (1898) (purpose of Act to
encourage irrigation and provide for acquisition of appropriate rights to use state water).
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the application of the common law riparian rights concept by applying the concept only to water rights granted by the sovereign before
1895. 43 Today, Texas makes appropriations of (1) flood waters,' (2)
waters in streams appurtenant to land originally granted by Spain and
Mexico,4 5 and (3) ordinary flows and underflows of streams appurte-

nant to land granted by Texas after July 1, 1895.46 Since the passage
of the Water Rights Adjudication Act of 1967,"7 which provides for
strict inventory and accounting of surface water use, the riparian
rights in water courses have been greatly restricted. No riparian right
will be recognized on lands which title has passed from the sovereign
after 1895.48 Further, the riparian rights which are vested have been
limited to the amount of water which the riparian owner actually used
between 1963 and 1967. 49
Although the doctrine of riparian rights is less frequently asserted,
once these rights are established they are equally enforceable as prior
appropriative rights.5" Today most, if not all, use of water is the re43. See Comment, Riparian Rights Under the Texas Water Rights Adjudication Act-A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 87, 87 (1977). Prior to 1895, Texas followed the
doctrine of riparian rights of English common law, but with the Irrigation Act of July 1, 1895,
the state adopted civil law which would not allow recognition of riparian rights in land granted
by state after that date. See id. at 87.
44. See Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 124, 286 S.W. 458, 474 (1926) (legislature authorized
appropriation of "storm and flood waters" so long as they do not prejudice existing and vested
riparian rights).
45. See State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1961) (Mexican and Spanish grants of land did not include riparian rights to use water and
therefore waters are subject to appropriation), opinion adopted, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502
(1962).
46. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § l1.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Code does not recognize any "riparian right in the owner of any land the title to which passed out of the State of
Texas after July 1, 1895").
47. See id. §§ 11.301 to -.321. The purpose of the Water Rights Adjudication Act was to
authorize and provide for recordation of water rights claims unrecorded, to limited water
claims not presently in use, and to adjudicate and administer surface water rights for the greatest possible use. See id. § 11.302.
48. See id. § 11.001(b) (Code does not recognize any "riparian right in the owner of any
land the title to which passed out of the State of Texas after July 1, 1895").
49. See id. §§ 11.301 to -.341 (act also provides riparian owners have vested rights in
water only to the extent that they factually exist and are being used); see also In re Adjudication of Upper Guadalupe River Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Tex.
1982) (decision recognized riparian right for water use for purposes of irrigation and livestock
maintenance, but right may be limited to amount of water actually used for such purposes
between the years of 1963 to 1967).
50. See In re Adjudication of Upper Guadalupe River Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) (right of riparian, whose land was acquired by grant
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sult of obtaining an appropriation permit from the state;51 therefore,

the prior appropriation system has become the most useful tool in
establishing adequate water flows necessary for the preservation of the
natural environment.5 2
III.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES

Maintaining and conserving the environment is the responsibility of
the public and since the prior appropriation system controls public
waters, it is the most effective means of ensuring environmental protection. 53 For many years predominant water law commentators have
suggested several justifications by which the public can guarantee basic water supply needs for environmental protection.54 Since it is the
public who benefits from environmental protection, 55public rights
should be asserted to reserve water in its natural state.
before 1895, is right to use water for beneficial purpose and cannot be defeated by
appropriators).
51. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.001 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (riparian rights will not
be recognized but to limited extent). Texas owns all public waters which may be appropriated
to beneficial uses. See id. §§ 11.021,-.023.
52. See id. § 11.022 (right to use water is acquired by appropriation permits and may be

used for specified beneficial purposes); see also Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow
Rights: "New" Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1, 24-3-4

(1979) (although originally not considered appropriate law for protection of instream use,
prior appropriations law has developed into beneficial tool for environmental protection);
Trelease, Uneasy Federalism--State Water Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WASH. L. REV.
751, 773 (1980) (devices for reserving minimum flow and instream flows are appropriations,
control of appropriations, or prevention of appropriations).
53. See Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 696 (1972) (California law establishing administrative appropriation of water rights can have major environmental impact); Tarlock, Recent
Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV.
871, 875 (environmental conservation may best be accomplished by perfection of instream
claims through prior appropriation system).
54. See, e.g., Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 876 (various theories in support of public claim of
water for instream uses include state's proprietary ownership or trusteeship of its water resources); Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerationsin Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 696 (1972) ("administrative allocation of water resources"
through water right permit system will significantly affect environmental conditions); Tarlock,
The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights: "New" Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY
MT. L. INST. 24-1, 24-3 (1979) (law of prior appropriation allows private and public entities to
acquire rights to instream uses).
55. See Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 875 (public protection of instream uses will ensure broad
distribution of benefits resulting from reserving water in place). Private appropriators have
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Because the benefits of natural flow protections accrue to the public
generally, it would be appropriate that rights to instream flows be asserted by public bodies or water allocation agencies.56 The authority
to regulate the use of water is inherent in the state's sovereign right of
control over the natural resources within its border.57 Texas, through
power granted pursuant to its Water Code, has not hesitated to exercise its sovereign right to regulate and manage public water sources.58

Similarly, various concepts have been expressed in constitutions and
statutes of western states establishing and regulating property rights
to water.5 9 These declarations range from theories of state ownership
to trusteeship, but essentially all are assertions of the state police
little or no incentive to appropriate water for instream flow in amounts sufficient for public
benefit. See id. at 875. Private persons have more incentive to appropriate for irrigation or
power generation which enable them to recapture benefits of water use through prices or otherwise. See id. at 875.
56. See Tarlock & Rice, Minimum Stream Flow Maintenance, PROCEEDINGS, WATER
LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, § 9, at 2 (1985) (recognition of instream values is
both technical and judgmental, and requires public policy making decisions normally not possible for private appropriators).
57. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). Justice Holmes
stated:
Each state has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breath pure air. It may have to pay
individuals before it can utter the word, but with it remains the final power.
Id. at 237; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 604 (1982)
(Puerto Rico has a quasi-sovereign interest in health and well-being of its residents, which
includes control of its natural resources); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 963 (1982)
(states have traditionally had authority over natural resources within its boundaries which are
essential to the very lives and well-being of its citizens).
58. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (state owns water of
"ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of
every bay or any of the Gulf of Mexico and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of
every river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed"); see also In re Adjudiciation of Upper Guadalupe River Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 625 S.W.2d 353,
360-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981) (Texas Water Rights Adjudiciation Act is not
unconstitutional because it is legitimate and valid exercise of state's police powers in interest of
public welfare), afid, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982). Many western states have passed adjudication statutes similar to Texas based on their police powers over natural resources, with each
withstanding constitutional attack. See, e.g., Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5,
16-17 (Cal. 1933) (limitation of riparian rights due to conservation statute is proper exercise of
police power to general welfare of community); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 591
(Kan. 1962) (statutory scheme regulating water appropriations valid exercise of police power);
In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 514 (Or. 1914) (water rights are subject to reasonable regulations to preserve public welfare).
59. Compare COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (every natural stream declared property of
people of state) with TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (unappropriated
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power.6 o
A.

Appropriative Rights

The most common means of regulating the use of water in Texas
and other western states is through the appropriative rights system.61
The prior appropriative rights system allows the state to allocate reasonable amounts of unappropriated waters to those persons who intend to use the water for beneficial or economic purposes.62 Water
allocation agencies review applications for appropriations and grant
rights to water use.6 3 When water availability decreases, those whose
rights which were filed "first in time are first in right."64
waters are property of the state); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (1984) (all water in
Kansas declared "dedicated to the use of the people of the state").
60. Compare Wyo. CONsT. art. 8, § 1 (unappropriated waters of the state are property of
the state of Wyoming) and N.D. CONST. art. II, § 3 (water declared to be property of the state)
with COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (unappropriated waters are public property held in trust by
state) and N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (unappropriated waters declare public property owned
by all citizens). Although the framers of the constitutional provisions, declaring ownership of
public waters, intended a distinction between ownership and trusteeship, courts have blurred
any distinction. See Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L.
REV. 638, 642 (1957) (many constitutional provisions seem to vary as to who is owner of
water); see also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 553, 529 (1911) (holding that idea of sovereignty provides constitutional justification for regulation of natural resources).
61. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-101 to -276 (Supp. 1986) (water rights administration based on appropriation of rights for water use by permit and application of water
to beneficial use); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-101 to -612 (Supp. 1985) (water rights established
through appropriation permits in beneficial use requirements); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 11.001 to -.409 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (acquisition and management of water rights based on
appropriations of water by permit for beneficial uses).
62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-141 to -156 (Supp. 1985) (appropriation of
water rights by state for beneficial uses allowed when unappropriated waters are available and
use is reasonable); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100-02 (Deering 1977) (state water must be put to
beneficial and reasonable use and state may grant right to use water by appropriation in manner provided by Code); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.021 to -.025 (Vernon Supp. 1986)
(state water may be acquired by appropriation when unappropriated water is available and any
acquired right must be beneficially used in amount specifically appropriated).
63. See I W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES,
302 (1971) (clear majority of western states require surface water appropriators to make application with state agency for appropriation permits). The statutory procedures which prescribe
method of application initiation and review are often the exclusive method of acquiring appropriation. See id. at 302.
64. See id. at 396 (essential element in doctrine of appropriation is fixed priority over
rights to use of water). The date of particular appropriation establishes superiority of rights;
the earlier dates being senior in right to later dated junior right holders. See id.at 396. Western minors soon learned that since there was not enough water for everyone that those "first in
time are first in right." See W. GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 15 (1984); see also TEX. WATER
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Many states have the power to appropriate instream water to public
or private entities in order to protect environmental interests. 6 Other
states withhold from any appropriation the minimum flow necessary
to preserve the ecological balance of water sources.66 By making determinations of the effect on minimum instream flows before granting
a use permit, other states have effectively maintained control of environmental needs and protected the interest of the public.6 7
The use of permits in Texas may well be the key to protecting instream flows of water.68 The permits are the means the Texas Water
Commission grants use and ownership of Texas water. 69 Any permit
granted by Texas is merely a license to use water and does not mature
CODE ANN. § 11.027 (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("As between appropriators, the first in time is the
first in right").
65. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (Supp. 1986) (Arizona Legislature has author-

ized appropriation for fishing or recreation to public or private entities); see also WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1986) (Department of Water may appropriate water to Department of Fisheries or Game Commission in order to establish minimum flows or levels).
66. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1985) (water may be reserved from appropriation
in order to protect minimum flows and levels in designated areas); see also CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1255 (Deering 1977) (California Water Rights Board may reject water permit and reserve
water for other beneficial uses). Although Texas does not have expressed reservation language,
policy consideraions may require protection of resources through reservation. See TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 1.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986). "It is the public policy of the state to
provide for the conservation and development of the state's natural resources, including:...
(6) the maintenance of a proper ecological environment of the bays and estuaries of Texas and
the health of released living marine resources." Id. § 1.003.
67. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-203B, 42-1501 (Supp. 1985) (legislature grants water
rights agency ability to subordinate all water rights which infringe on established minimum
stream flows). The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that authority to reject environmentally
damaging appropriations, as well as conditioning permits on instream uses, is valid exercise of
duty of water rights agency. See Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448-49 (Idaho 1985) (public
interest requires director of water resources to reject applications which unreasonably effect
fish and wildlife habitats, recreation, or aesthetic beauty); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8
(Supp. 1985) (denial of appropriation permit if unreasonably affects natural stream environment or public recreation).
68. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.135 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (issuance of permit restricts applicants right to use water only for "purposes stated in the permit").
69. See id. § 11.121 (permit required to take water). "Except as provided in section
11.142 of this Code, no person may appropriate any state water or begin construction of any
work designed for the storage, taking, or diversion of water without first obtaining a permit
from commission to make the appropriation." Id. § 11.121 (emphasis added). Section 11.142
provides that no permit is required for those persons impounding water for livestock purposes
or for those persons drilling for and producing petroleum if they take their waters from the
Gulf of Mexico. See id. § 11.142; see also City of Corpus Christi v. Nueces County Water
Control & Improvement Dist. No. 3, 540 S.W.2d 357, 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (after passage of Irrigation Act of 1913, water appropriations by permit
established authorizations for water rights obtained under state administration); cf Irrigation
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into a vested appropriation right until water is "beneficially used" for
the purposes stated in the permit.7 ° Common beneficial uses include
the use of water for livestock watering, irrigation, or hydroelectric
power.7' Texas defines beneficial use in chapter 11 of the Texas Water
Code7 2 and describes the purposes or uses for which water may be
appropriated." Instream uses for preservation of the environment are
not included within these purposes, and it may be possible to argue

Act of 1913, Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 171, §§ 1-14, at 358, 16 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 358,
1913 (water appropriations only made by permit issued from Board of Water Engineers).
70. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.025 to -.026 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The section
states:
A right to use state water under a permit or a certified filing is limited not only to the
amount specifically appropriated but also to the amount which is being or can be beneficially used for the purposes specified in the appropriation and all water not so used is
considered not appropriated.
Id. § 11.025. Furthermore, section 11.026 states that "[n]o right to appropriate water is perfected unless the water has been beneficially used .. " Id. § 11.026; see also Lower Colorado
River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d 873, 882 (Tex. 1984) (water
commission may not grant permit to person who will not beneficially use water) (citing In re
Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.
1982)); Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. 1971) (duty of
permit owner or appropriator to beneficially use water).
71. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (purposes for which
permit may be granted include: irrigation, navigation, mining recovery of minerals, hydroelectric power, and stock raising).
72. The Texas Water Code defines beneficial use as follows:
'Beneficial use' means use of the amount of water which is economically necessary for a
purpose authorized by this chapter, when reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence
are used in applying the water to that purpose.
Id. § 11.002(4).
73. The Water Code provides further for the purposes for which water may be appropriated. Section 11.023 provides:
(a) State water may be appropriated, stored, or diverted for:
(1) domestic and municipal uses, including water for sustaining human life and the life
of domestic animals; (2) industrial uses, meaning processes designed to convert materials
of a lower order of value into forms having greater usability and commercial value, including the development of power by means other than hydroelectric; (3) irrigation; (4)
mining and recovery of minerals; (5) hydroelectric power; (6) navigation; (7) recreation
and pleasure; (8) stock raising; (9) public parks; and (10) game preserves.
(b) State water also may be appropriated, stored or diverted for any other beneficial use.
(c) Unappropriated storm water and floodwater may be appropriated to recharge underground freshwater bearing sands and aquifers in the portion of the Edwards Underground
Reservoir located within Kinney, Uvalde, Medina, Bexar, Comal, and Hays Counties, if it
can be established by expert testimony that an unreasonble loss of state water will not
occur and that the water can be withdrawn at a later time for application to a beneficial
use. The normal or ordinary flow of a stream or watercourse may never be appropriated,
diverted or used by a permittee for this recharge purpose.
(d) When it is put or allowed to sink into the ground, water appropriated under Subsec-
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that instream flows are not a beneficial use. Furthermore, instream
uses do not fit within the ordinary diversion requirement for water
appropriation.
1. Beneficial Use Requirement
Texas Water Code section 11.025 sets out the "beneficial use" requirement for Texas appropriation rights which is essential for any
valid appropriation claim.74 Texas decisions base the validity of an
appropriation on the reasonableness of the use.75 In addition, the
Texas Supreme Court has equated non-use of appropriated water with
tion (c) of this section loses its character and classification as storm water or floodwater
and is considered percolating groundwater.
(e) The amount of water appropriated for each purpose meantioned in this section shall

be specifically appropriated for that purpose, subject to the preferences prescribed in Section 11.024 of this Code.
(f) The water of any arm, inlet, or bay of the Gulf of Mexico may be changed from salt
water to sweet or fresh water and held or stored by dams, dikes, or other structures and
may be taken or diverted for any purpose authorized by this Chapter.

Id. § 11.023.
74. See id. § 11.025 (right to use water limited to amount being beneficially used); see also
Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Tex. Dep't of Water Resources, 638 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1982) (right to use water under appropriative system is limited to beneficial and
non wasteful uses), rev'd on othergrounds, 689 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1984). The right to use water
will be limited to one or more of the prescribed purposes of § 11.023 of the Water Code. Id. at
562 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023 (Vernon Supp. 1986)).

75. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. 1971) (permittee is limited to rights to appropriate water for reasonable uses); see also Johnson, Legal
Assurances of Adequate Flows of Freshwaterinto Texas Bays and Estuariesto Maintain Proper
Salinity Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 613 (1973) (Supreme Court of Texas has qualified every
appropriative right to reasonable use limitation). This reasonableness is similar to standard
applied to riparian right owners. See Schero v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 630 S.W.2d
516, 520 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982) (riparian owner's rights to water use are limited to the
reasonableness of use, without waste, and any use not conforming to reasonableness may be
prevented), affid in part & rev'd in part,In re Adjudication of Water Rights in the Llano River
Watershed of Colorado River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1982). Several western states require that any use which consumes excessive amounts of water is not beneficial use. E.g., In re
Water Rights of Deschutes River, 286 P. 563, 577 (Or. 1930) (one is entitled only to such
amounts of water reasonably necessary for useful purpose and cannot waste water for even
useful purposes). A power company tried to obtain large amounts of water to carry off debris
from a dam site, during a period of time when water was in great demand. See id at 575; see
also Tulane Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Stratmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1935) (water used for beneficial purpose will not be reasonable if water in scarce supply
and considered excess in view of actual needs). Appropriators in Lindsay wanted to use water
to irrigate their land during the winter in order to kill gophers, but the court considered such
use wasteful due to other beneficial uses and scarce water supply. See id. at 1007; accord
Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107, 123-25 (1912). The excess use of
water is often considered non-beneficial when there are competing demands for scarce water
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waste which could result in permit cancellation.16 The non-use waste
equation could become significant if Texas is to appropriate instream
flows for preservation of the environmental instream flows. 77 Instream uses will have to be recognized as a beneficial use and the fact
that water is left in its natural state should not be classified as a nonuse, resulting in waste.' 8
It may be argued, however, that the Water Code already defines
instream uses as beneficial by using the terms "recreational and pleasure."' 79 Unless adjudication frees available water, as a practical matter, an appropriation permit for instream flows is highly unlikely even

supply and other more efficient means are available for meeting those demands. See id. at 12325.
76. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. 1971) (common to western states and appropriation law, non-use of appropriated waters is equivalent to
waste); Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 638 S.W.2d 557, 565
(Tex. App.-Austin 1982) (ten years of non-use of appropriated right subjects permit holder to
forfeiture of all rights and cancellation by state), rev'd on othergrounds, 689 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.
1984). The cancellation of water permit for non-use is not an unconstitutional taking and does
not require compensation. See id. 564-65; see also TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.030 (Vernon
Supp. 1986) (forfeiture of appropriation). The section states:
If any lawful appropriation or use of state water is willfully abandoned during any three
successive years, the right to use water is forfeited and the water is subject to
appropriation.
Id. § 11.030.
77. See Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Tex. Dep't of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d 873,
882 (Tex. 1984) (no person is granted right to waste water by non-use).
78. See id. at 882 (Texas Legislature recognizes importance of beneficial use, and no one
is granted "the right to waste water by not using it"). But see, e.g., Note, Arizona Water Law:
The Problem of Instream Appropriation for Environmental Use By Private Appropriators, 21
ARIz. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (1979) (Arizona recognizes beneficial use of preservation of wildlife
and therefore problem of "recognizing use of water for environmental purposes is overcome");
Note, Protecting Stream Flows in California, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697, 713-14 (1980) (California
may appropriate water for instream uses in order to protect environment because California
statute authorizes "enhancement of fish and wildlife" water use as beneficial); Note, Appropriation by the State of Minimum Flows in New Mexico's Streams, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 809,
814 (1975) (New Mexico legislature has power to define "beneficial use" and should do so in
order to protect riparian environment and wildlife habitats); accord WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 90.54.020(1) (1986 Supp.) (wildlife enhancement and maintenance are fundamental considerations which legislature has expressed as guidelines in water management).
79. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (purposes for which
unappropriated may be directed); see also Note, Arizona Water Law: The Problem of Instream
Appropriationfor Environmental Use By Private Appropriators, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1095, 1105
n.68 (1979). "Insofar as recreational uses include those activities which depend on or at least
utilize riparian environments (bird watching, hunting, fishing, camping, for example), it is
plausible to argue that 'recreation' uses must entail preservation of riparian habitats." Id. at
1105 n.68. But see Tex. Water Dev. Board, 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 301.71 (Shepard's 1985)
(defines "recreation use" as "the use of water impounded in or diverted or released from a
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for the most beneficial use since unregulated flows in many Texas
water courses are already at their full appropriation capacity. 0 However, large quantities of appropriated waters are unused because of
"padding" and "pyramiding" water rights (creating records of water
rights in excess of actual use)" and reassessment8 2 will make unused
rights free to be appropriated for instream flows.
It seems settled, however, that should the Texas Water Commission
grant a permit for instream use, it would have a good chance withstanding any contentions that environmental protections are not beneficial.13 Instream use would most likely be viewed as beneficial
because the Water Commission has discretionary powers to uphold

reservoir or water course for fishing, swimming, water skiing, boating, hunting and other
forms of water recreation ...").
80. See Johnson, Legal Assurances ofAdequate Flows of Freshwater into Texas Bays and
Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 613 (1973) (unregulated
flows of water, flows not released for storage facilities, in many streams are at their appropriative capacity). Since 1962, the Texas Water Commission could not have granted permits to
appropriate water "from the Brazos River Basin and all other river basins south and west of
that basin" unless additional storage areas could provide extra releases. See id. at 613; cf
Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 376 (1985) (water scarcity grows as appropriative water permits "lock up" higher percentages of available water).
81. See W. GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 18 (1984) (very common in many appropriative
right states is padding of water rights which creates rights to water not actually used).
82. See Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d
873, 876 (Tex. 1985) (stacking or "double permitting" of water rights prohibited by Texas
statute and permits must be cancelled for non-use before water can be appropriated to future
uses); see also TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.025, -.134, -.146 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (water
not subject to appropriation until permit cancelled by non-use and water which is under state
permit not considered unappropriated).
83. See Southern Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'r., 159 Tex. 227, 233, 318 S.W.2d
619, 623-24 (1958) (judgments made by administrative agency, concerning applications for
permits to appropriate water, upheld by judiciary if substantial evidence to support it); see also
W. GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 19 (1984) (rarely will courts overturn water agency decision
because fundamental principle of administrative law allows courts to overturn decisions only if
they violate statutes and are clearly irrational or infringe on constitutional rights). But see
Tulane Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Stratmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. Ct. App.
1935) (although water is used for beneficial purpose, some uses will be considered non-beneficial and wasteful in times of scarce supply and other greater uses for water are determined to
exist); accord TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (public policy of Texas
to give weighted priority to certain uses above others). See generally State v. Hidalgo County
Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 18, 443 S.W.2d 728, 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (determination of water rights for irrigation of Rio Grande
waters, proper to utilize weighted priority system rather than strict compliance "first in time
first in right").
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permits which are given great deference by the courts.8 4 If preservation of minimum instream flows can be considered a "beneficial use"
by the courts, such characterization would support an appropriative
5
right granted for instream uses.
2.

Diversion Requirement

Instream flows remain confined to natural banks of a stream or lake
and in some jurisdictions an instream appropriation cannot be maintained if a physicial diversion of water is not made. 6 The requirement of diversion is a means of perfecting an appropriative right to
8 7
water and imparting notice to others that a claim already exists.
Diversion is but an element of other appropriation requirements, such
as a manifestation of an intention to appropriate and the beneficial use
requirement.8 8 Instream use, however, remains in the natural flow of
a river or lake and by definition are not diverted from their natural
course.89 Once an instream use has been determined to be beneficial,
84. See Southern Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'r., 159 Tex. 227, 231-32, 318
S.W.2d 619, 623-24 (1958) (judgments made by administrative agency concerning permits for
appropriations given deference if substantial evidence supports it).
85. See State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 927-28
(Idaho 1974) (when preservation of water for instream use defined as "beneficial use," court
less likely to disturb legislative intent and uphold appropriation for those purposes). The
Supreme Court of Idaho suggested that without legislative expression defining beneficial use,
such holding would not likely occur. See id. at 927-28.
86. See Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 524 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (physical act or diversion required unless legislation removes requirement); see also
Reynolds v. Miranda, 493 P.2d 409, 411 (N.M. 1972) (physical diversions along with intent to
apply to beneficial use necessary for valid appropriation).
87. See Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Use in Western
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 877-88 (diversion requirement imparts "notice to others
that claims to use existed against the stream") (quoting MEYER, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION LAW 7 (Nat'l Water Comm'n 1971)); see also W.
GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 17-18 (1984) (generally actual diversion is necessary to perfect appropriative right). In Colorado, overt acts such as diversion serve to provide sufficient notice
that appropriation and demand for water exists, and along with filing of a map and statement
with the state engineer, serves to complete the requisites of manifestation of intent and application to beneficial use. See Denver v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 699 P.2d 730,
748 (Colo. 1985).
88. See State of Arizona v. State of California, 298 U.S. 558, 560 (1936) (appropriation
law requires that appropriator perfect his use by diverting water to a beneficial purpose and
imparting notice to others that water is being applied to such beneficial use). Three traditional
requirements exist for valid appropriation: (1) intent to appropriate; (2) an actual diversion;
and (3) an application to a beneficial use. See Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition
of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 877.
89. See State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 929 (Idaho
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the justification for a requirement of actual diversion seems to diminish. 90 Other western states which require diversion for ordinary appropriations, exclude instream uses from this requirement, stating the
diversion requirement is irreconcilable with non-consumptive instream uses. 91
The Texas Water Code does not statutorily require a physical act of
diversion with respect to an appropriation permit, but it has been suggested that section 11.134 of the Water Code implies such a require1974) (to require diversion of instream appropriation would be to nullify effect of statute authorizing appropriation). The court held that physical diversion would not be required since
this would not effectuate legislative intent. See id.at 929; see, e.g., Lionelle v. Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Colo. 1984) (two prong test required
for appropriative right include (1) intent to appropriate specific amount of water for beneficial
use and (2) overt manifestation of that intent or diversion sufficient to constitute notice to
others); Reynolds v. Miranda, 493 P.2d 409, 411 (N.M. 1972) (man-made diversion is necessary element in order to claim water rights by appropriation in agricultural uses); Right Nahas
Co. v. Hulet, 674 P.2d 1036, 1042-43 (Idaho App. 1983) (statutes regulating appropriations of
water incorporates actual physicial diversion). See generally Tarlock, Recent Developments in
the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 871, 877-78
(diversion requirement gives "notice to others that claims to use existed against the stream")
(citing MEYERS, HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION LAW 7
(Nat'l Water Comm'n 1971)).
90. See State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 933 (Idaho
1974) (Bakes, J., concurring) (absent statute requiring diversion, no diversion required on instream appropriation for beneficial purpose). Justice Bakes stated, quoting federal precedent:
" 'If nature accomplishes a result which is recognized and utilized, a change of process by man
would seem unnecessary,' and, 'Undoubtedly a landowner may rely upon an efficient application by nature, and need to no more than affirmatively to avail himself of it;'..
. ." Id. at 933
(Bakes, J., concurring) (quoting Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123
(8th Cir. 1913)); cf Note, ProtectingStream Flows in California, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697, 717-18
(1980). California's legislature has not expressed requirements of diversion or manifestation of
intent through physical acts, although the courts have required that such a requirement exists.
Legislation regulating appropriations proscribes "proposed place of diversion" along with
where "works" are to be constructed and this has been interpreted as intent to require diversion. See id.at 717-18.
91. See State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 930 (Idaho
1974) (Bakes, J., concurring) (Department of Parks is allowed to appropriate instream flows
for recreation and preservation of aesthetics without actual physical diversion). The court
reasoned that legislation allowing preservation of the scenic beauty of Malad Canyon was not
intended to require actual diversion. See id.at 929. Justice Bakes in a concurring opinion
stated that when "a beneficial use can be made of the water in its natural channel [the Idaho
Constitution] should not require the superfious effort of construction of a diversion." See id. at
934 (Bakes, J., concurring); see also Stevenson v. Steele, 453 P.2d 819, 826 (Idaho 1969) (instream use of water in order to water livestock during winter months is a beneficial use requiring protection without the requirement of physicial diversion).
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ment. 92 Should Texas courts interpret section 11.134 as requiring
physical diversion, the courts should follow the lead of other appropriative stateg and exclude instream use from this requirement.93
Once appropriations for instream flows are considered to be beneficial
uses and the diversion exemption created, the permits which may then
be issued and recorded will serve as notice to others that claims al94
ready exist for instream water.

92. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Water Commission's
actions with respect to application for appropriation). The section states:
(a) [A]fter the hearing ... (b) the Commission shall grant the application only if:
(1) the application conforms to the requirements prescribed by this chapter and is accompanied by the prescribed fee; (2) unappropriated water is available in the source of
supply; (3) the proposed appropriation (A) contemplates the application of water to any
beneficial use; (B) does not impair existing water rights or vested riparian rights; and (C)
is not detrimental to the public welfare; and (4) the applicant has provided evidence that
reasonable diligence will be used to avoid waste and achieve water conservation as defined
by Subdivision (8)(B), Section 11.002, of this Code.
Id. § 11.134. Although section 11.134 does not express the requirement of diversion, other
sections suggest that diversion is an intricate part of granting appropriative rights. See id.
§ 11.026. The statute provides that "no right to appropriate water is perfected unless the
" See id. § 11.026.
water has been beneficially used for the purpose stated in ... a permit ..
Professor Johnson suggests that this requirement in section 11.026 may not be fulfilled absent
actual diversion. See Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate Flows of Water into Texas Bays
and Estuaries to Maintain ProperSalinity Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 616 (1973); see also
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.022 (Vernon's Supp. 1986) (acquisition of right to use water of
state). "When the right to use water is lawfully acquired, it may be taken or diverted from its
natural channel." Id. § 11.022. The need for diversion seems to be required for an appropriative right to be obtained in section 11.022; otherwise, the statutes allowing forfeiture for nonuse may be applied. See id. §§ 11.171 to -. 186 (forfeiture of rights upon showing of abandonment and non-use).
93. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 672,
674 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (although California statutes define "enhancement of fish and wildlife" beneficial use and no statutes expressly require diversion, state of California cannot appropriate water for instream use without "some physicial act with respect to water"); Fullerton v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (State of
California cannot appropriate water for instream use as defined by California law because state
would not divert or exercise physical control over water).
94. Issued permits serve notice to others that water is appropriated in Texas, because
actual use and diversions play no part in determining amount of water available for appropriation. Cf Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d 873,
875 (Tex. 1984) (water agency takes into account uncancelled permits to determine amount of
water which is unappropriated). The Texas Supreme Court concluded that regardless of
amounts of water not diverted to their beneficial uses, a permit cannot be granted on already
appropriated water which remains instream wrongfully. See id. at 875-76.
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Administrative Reservation or Withdrawal of Water Required
for Instream Uses

An alternative to recognizing and granting new instream uses and
rights would be to grant the Texas Water Commission the power to
deny new permits for water appropriations so as to reserve amounts of
water to maintain adequate instream flows. 95 Most western states authorize their water agencies to reject applications for unappropriated
water if the water resource agencies find that appropriations would
not be in the "public interest."'9 6 In addition, to rejecting permits
which could damage instream flows, agencies have been authorized to
condition permits on the maintenance of minimum instream flows
which advance public interest. 97 Thus, legislative definitions of public
interest have become the standards by which the water agencies determine which use will be in furtherance of the greatest public benefit.9
The "public interest" was historically defined in the terms of
"crude economic efficiency," 9 9 but today many legislatures have in95. See Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 877 (viable alternative to preserve environmental conditions other than granting instream appropriations, would be denying applications for out-ofstream appropriations and diversions).
96. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (Deering 1977) (Water Rights Board shall reject
application for appropriation when it decides such an appropriation would not be in "the
public interest"); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(4) (Supp. 1985) (water allocation agency possesses right upon hearing all interested parties to deny application for water right if it proves
detrimental to public interest); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290 (1962) (if appropriation
threatens or proves detrimental to public interest duty of supervisor to reject application). But
see IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3 ("[t]he right to divert and appropriate waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied"). Idaho's Supreme Court has allowed instream appropriations following legislative authorization. See State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho
Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Idaho 1974) (legislature has declared recreation
and aesthetics as beneficial uses which water may be appropriated).
97. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (Deering 1977) (allows appropriations for beneficial
purposes subject to any terms and conditions which best conserve public interest).
98. See Johnson Rancho County Water Dist. v. State Water Rights Bd., 45 Cal. Rptr.
589, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (defining characteristics of "public interest"). The court
stated:
'Public interest' is the primary statutory standard guiding the [water agency] in acting
upon applications to appropriate water. The [agency] is to consider the variety of beneficial uses which the particular water may serve and may subject the appropriation to conditions which will best develop and conserve the water in the public interest.
Id. at 596.
99. See Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 702 (1972) (public interest was equated with economic
interest and allowed determinations based on profitability of intended use); Tarlock, Recent
Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV.
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cluded values such as fish and wildlife preservation and ecosystem
maintenance." ° The expansion of the public interest stems mainly
from the incorporation of state environmental protection acts into administrative decisions.° 1 Prior to the recent enactments found in the
1986 Water Code, Texas was without express authority to reserve
water from appropriations based on public interest reasons.102 Without express recognition under the Water Code authorizing the Water
Commission to reserve instream flows on behalf of the "public interest," an effective method of preserving the ecological balance remains
unavailable in Texas. 103
871, 888-89 (originally public interest considerations would allow denial of appropriation permit if water projects that needed water seemed doomed for bankruptcy). When water projects
became funded by public entities, the likelihood of financial stability increased and focus
shifted to determinations of whether the appropriation would interfere with a more beneficial
use. See id. at 889.
100. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (Supp. 1985) (to determine public interest,
commissioner must consider "the effect [of appropriation] on fish and game resources and on
public recreational opportunities"); IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (Supp. 1985) (legislature declared
that it is in public interest "to preserve the minimum stream flows required for the protection
of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation value..."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020 (Supp. 1986) (one fundamental consideration will be quality of natural environment and its protection and enhancement whenever
possible). See generally Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROCKY
MTN. L. INST. 917, 920-21 (1977) (antiquated water law concepts exist and should be updated
to broaden public interest considerations).
101. See Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerationsin Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 702-03 (1972) (California's environmental quality act provided in all public decisions state must "take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and
enhance" environmental quality of California) (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(b)
(West Supp. 1972)). The Environmental Protection Act requires governmental agencies to
consider factors and/or alternatives to actions affecting environmental concerns. See id. at
703; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 21000-21001 (Deering 1976) (declarations of
legislative intent and policy for protection of environmental quality). "It is the intent of legislature that all agencies of the state government ... shall regulate ... activities so that major
consideration is given to preventing environmental damage." Id. § 21000; see also Friends of
Mammoth v. Mono County, 502 P. 2d 1049, 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (Cal. 1972) (holding that legislature intended to include private activities for which governmental permits are
required within Environmental Quality Act).
102. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (action taken by
commission on application for appropriation contemplates several things, none of which are
"public interests") with CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (Deering 1977) (denial of permit allowed
by Water Rights Board when it decides appropriation is not in "public interest"); see also
Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate Flows of Freshwaterinto Texas Bays and Estuaries to
Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 620 (1973) (Texas has no statutory
authority to reserve water from appropriation process, however, authority may be implied
within Water Code).
103. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (commission may
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1. Texas Authority to Reserve and Deny Applications for
Environmental Protection
Texas, like many appropriation states, may deny appropriation permits if granting the permit is not in the public interest to grant, and
should utilize this authority to protect minimum stream flows."
Legislation was proposed in 1969 which would sanction the reservation of water for estuarian purposes but the Texas Water Commission
stated it already had such authorization under the then effective Texas
Water Code."15 The Water Code continues to require the commission
to consider whether an appropriation is "detrimental to the public
welfare." 10° 6 The definition of "public welfare" has been expanded to
apply to the preservation of environmental ecosystems in many western jurisdictions.10 7 The Texas Supreme Court has held, however,
that determinations on issues of "public welfare" are within the discretion of the Water Commission, and any denial based on this provision need only be supported by substantial evidence."18 The question
deny application if "detrimental to public welfare," but no expansion on what considerations
further "public welfare") with ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1985) (determining public interest
requires consideration of". . . effect on fish and game resources and ...recreational opportunities") and IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e) (Supp. 1985) (public interest requires consideration of "affairs of people directly affected by the proposed use"). The Idaho Supreme Court
has determined that "public interest" of section 42-203A(5)(e) requires consideration of affects
on "fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty ... and water quality."
See Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448-49 (Idaho 1985).
104. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas Water Commission may deny application in whole or in part when detrimental to "public welfare").
105. See Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate Flows of Fresh Water into Texas Bays
and Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 620-21 (1973). The
commission takes the position that legislation expressing authority to reserve water for instream purposes is not needed because section 11.134 gives them a general grant of power
broad enough to effectuate such reservation. See id. at 621.
106. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
107. See Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 964 (Utah 1943) ("anything not in the best
interest of the public would be 'detrimental to the public welfare' "). The water allocation
agency denied an application for appropriation because they determined that granting permit
would be detrimental to "public welfare." See id. at 964. The decision was based on statutory
preference for uses such as livestock watering and irrigation, and such denial would not have
been possible without the preference for other uses. See id. at 963; see also Young & Norton v.
Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910) (holding that between competing uses of water for
irrigation, denial of application acceptable because cost effectiveness of application "contrary
to the public interest"); compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986)
(denial of permits allowed when "detrimental to public welfare") with UTAH CODE ANN. § 733-8(e) (Supp. 1985) (may deny permit when it "unreasonably affect[s] ... natural stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare").
108. See City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n, 407 S.W.2d 752, 764 (Tex. 1966)
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remains whether or not the "public welfare" consideration authorizes
environmental protection or will it remain narrowly defined until
there is an authorized expansion by the legislature. 0 9 Texas should
respond by adopting expanded definitions of "public welfare" to allow
1 10
for the protection of wildlife, recreation, and asthetic uses.
2.

Conditioning Permits on Future Instream Needs

The Texas Water Code authorizes the Texas Water Commission to
deny appropriations of waters when it is not in the state's best interest
to grant the appropriation and recognizes the commission's inherent
power to condition appropriations on future instream needs.Il This
power is derived from section 11.134 which allows an appropriation

(when contemplating whether appropriation is not detrimental to public welfare, Water Commission must utilize their sound and reasonable discretion).
109. See Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 963 (Utah 1943) (state water boards denial of
appropriation permit was based on public welfare reasons because of existence of statutory
preference for livestock watering over uses for power generation). In 1971, the Utah Legislature responded to the need for express recognition of instream uses for environment protection
and authority for administrative denials based on environmental interests. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-3-8(e) (Supp. 1985) (authorizes denials in public interest which might unreasonably
affect public recreation associated with natural stream environment). See generally Tarlock,
Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH
L. REV. 871, 888 (various western states expressly require recognition of instream values with
authority to deny appropriative permits if these environments unreasonably affected).
110. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1983) (in determining "public interest," must
consider "effect on fish and game resources and ... public recreational opportunities"); IDAHO
CODE § 42.1501 (Supp. 1986) (public interest elements are listed as "fish and wildlife habitat,
aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, transporation..."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(e)
(Supp. 1985) (authorizes denial of appropriations if they unreasonably affect public interest in
public recreation or natural stream environment).
111. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (authorizes Texas
Water Commission to deny applications which it determines is "detrimental to public welfare"); see also East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Department of Public Works, 32 P.2d 1027, 1029
(Cal. 1934) (if statutory prerequisites are not met, application may be rejected entirely or permit may be issued with conditions); Kirk v. State Bd. of Irrigation, 134 N.W. 167, 169 (Neb.
1912) (if public welfare so demands, state may grant qualified right of appropriation in use of
water); accord WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.247 (West Supp. 1986) (if appropriations
granted on streams to which minimum flow levels adopted, permit conditioned to protect
levels and flows); cf State v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 602 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. 1979)
(statutory grant of power to obstruct, divert or change natural water flows necessarily encompasses authority to impose conditions on permits) (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Olympia
Dredging Co., 260 U.S. 205, 208 (1922) (interpreting act of Congress granting Secretary of
War authority over construction involving certain waterways)). The Court stated "the power
to approve implies the power to disapprove and the power to disapprove necessarily includes
the lesser power to condition an approval." Id. at 208.
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to be denied in "whole or in part."' 12 Section 11.134 gives the commission at least the implied authority to grant permits based on the
satisfying of certain conditions.' 1 3 The Texas Water Code also provides in section 11.135 that in each permit granted, the commission
14
shall specify "other information the Commission may proscribe.""
The commission has not hesitated to utilize this authority to condition permits in the past,II5 and this power could be effectively used to
subordinate an appropriated right to the protection of instream flows
16
based on public interest concerns which might arise in the future."
Furthermore, the possibility of conditioning permits based on the
public interest is more viable when considering that the 1985 Water
Package expressly allows conditioned permits for estuarian maintenance." 7 With the recognition of estuarian protection as grounds for
conditioning permits it seems logical that the Water Commission
should also be granted authority to provide for additional instream
use protection.

112. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
113. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Olympia Dredging Co., 260 U.S. 205, 208 (1922) (power
to deny permits by administrative entity necessarily encompasses lesser power to condition
approval of permit); see also Tex. Water Dev. Board, 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.151 to .152 (Shepard's 1985) (appropriation right granted by Commission may be conditioned subject
to superior water rights holders, or conditions reasonably necessary to enforce water laws); see
also Texas Water Rights Commission, Permit No. 2776 (Sept. 25, 1972) (permit granted conditioned and subject "as may be determined by the commission, to the release of water for the
maintenance of Lavaca Matagorda Bay and Estuary System").
114. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.135(b)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (provision outlines written material which permit must contain such as specific purposes for which permit is
granted); cf South Texas Water Co. v. Bieri, 247 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (appropriation does not acquire ownership of water, but merely right to
use water only for purposes stated in permit).
115. See Texas Water Rights Commission, Permit No. 2776 (Sept. 25, 1972) (permit
granted conditioned and subject "as may be determined by the Commission, to the release of
water for the maintenance of Lavaca Matagorda Bay and Estuary System").
116. Cf WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.247 (permit "shall be conditioned to protect
minimum flows and levels" when state has determined and adopted approved levels to be
maintained).
117. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.135(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Water Commission

now has authority to condition new permits on stream flows necessary to maintain ecologically
sound environment in bays and estuaries). The provision has similarity to other western legislation allowing conditioning on minimum flows. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203B (Supp.
1985) (conditioning allowed when permit effects minimum flow standards); see also WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.247 (Supp. 1985) (Washington requires conditions be placed on
permits that affect established minimum flow levels).
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The Public Trust Doctrine

One theory entirely different from appropriative rights which may
be used to ensure environmental protection of instream flows is the
public trust doctrine. 18 The public trust doctrine invests the state
with duties as trustee of public waters.' 19 The doctrine has recently
gained popularity among legal writers as a concept which may guar-

antee protection of fish and wildlife habitats. 2 ' The doctrine is based
on a state's ownership of the beds of navigable waters and imposes a
duty upon the state to protect public rights, navigation, commerce,
and fisheries. 1 2' The doctrine has developed as a response to the
state's continuing propensity to grant private parties rights in public
waters thereby resulting in significant deprivation of public rights in
118. See Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d
1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983) (public trust interest which state must protect includes "navigation,
fish and widlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality); National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364 (1983) (public
trust doctrine must respond to water allocation and management and promote development of
instream trust values).
119. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346, 356 (1983) (holding that public trust doctrine encompasses values of ecology including
scenic views, purity of air, nesting, and feeding by birds); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,
380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971) (California recognizes growing public interest in quality of
environment within public trust).
120. See, e.g., Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 233, 266 (1980) (application of public trust will aid protection of future needs
in "navigation, fishery, environmental quality and other public trust uses"); Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR
L. REV. 365, 376 (1985) (recent decisions have expanded public trust interests to protection of
food supplies, spawning sites, nesting areas, and fish habitats); Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1403, 1440 n.108
(West, Midwest, and Atlantic coasts have utiized public trust doctrine to protect fish and
animal habitats). The California Supreme Court has recently held that it is the affirmative
duty of the California Water Board to consider the public trust concerns before allocating any
water resources that may be detrimental to the environment. See National Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364 (1983).
121. See, e.g., City of Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 330, 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033
(1940) (state owns lands underlying navigable waters and holds title in trust for public); Landry v. Robinson, 110 Tex. 295, 298, 219 S.W. 819, 820 (1920) (state holds title to soil under
navigable waters in trust for public); City of Austin v. Hall, 93 Tex. 591, 597, 57 S.W. 563, 564
(1900) (Texas holds in trust for public, title to land underlying navigable waters). See generally Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and
Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 376 (1985) (public trust imposes on sovereign right and
duty to control overlying water courses for protection of public rights). The public trust emphasizes the historical issue of a state's fiduciary obligation as sovereign to protect the public
rights of navigation, fisheries and commerce. See id. at 376.
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important water courses. 122 Under the public trust doctrine, however,
affected parties can petition state agencies to enforce public trust
rights and seek judicial protection of their public rights to natural
23
resources. 1
By employing the doctrine of public trust, many states have provided for protection of wildlife food supplies, nesting areas, spawning
124
sites, in addition to preserving the environment in its natural state.
Texas has failed to fully utilize the public trust doctrine to preserve
the environment and instead has limited the doctrine's application to
25
areas concerning navigation, commerce, and fishing industries.
122. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970). The modern public trust doctrine finds its roots
in early English common law when the Parliament would try to restrict the sovereign's ability
to alienate the crown's land to private parties without considering the consequences of its effect
on public rights. See id. at 476. Whatever restraint may have been imposed on the King, it
was nevertheless justified as being within the police powers of Parliament. See id. at 476. As a
result, certain lands have traditionally been protected for benefit of the public such as navigation and fishing and these notions have been carried over into America as well. See id. at 47576; see also, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 5 (1821) (early acknowledgment of public trust in
New Jersey). The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that a sovereign could not "consistently
with the principles of the law and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and
absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right." Id.
at 5. The United States Supreme Court invoked the public trust doctrine in a famous case
which allowed the Illinois Legislature to revoke a patent of 1,000 acres of commercial waterfront of Chicago issued to Illinois Central Railroad. See Illinois Central RR. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892). The Court stated:
[T]he state holds the title to the land under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan...
and that title necessarily carries with it control over the waters above ... but it is a title
different in character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale ...It is a
title held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties .... The control of the state for the purposes
of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment
of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.
Id. at 452-53.
123. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 648 P.2d 709, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346, 369 (1983) (plaintiff may challenge water agencies permits and licenses during agency
proceedings or challenge actions in courts of law).
124. See id. at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (purpose of public trust is to be flexible and
allow expansion as to protect lands that it encompasses, preserving them in their natural state).
See generally Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 17891920, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1403, 1440 n.108 (food supplies, nesting areas, spawning and fish
habitats are all within protective interests of the public trust).
125. See Mot] v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 111, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926) (Texas by statute owns
title to water in navigable streams and holds title to its waters in trust for public); see also City
of Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 329, 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (1940) ("The rule has long
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While the public trust doctrine appears to be an attractive alternative
to protecting instream flows, doubt has been expressed concerning its
effectiveness without legislative guidance on determining minimum
stream flow requirements. 126 The public trust doctrine usually acts to
reclaim a damaging appropriation. 127 For example, if the Water
Commission grants a permit to take water that infringes upon public
right to navigate freely on that water, the public trust doctrine requires the State to step in and reclaim that public right. 128 Since the
been established in this state that the state is the owner of the soil underlying the navigable
waters," and that all such lands are held in trust for the benefit of all residents) (quoting Texas
v. Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 528, 50 S.W.2d 1065, 1069 (1935)); Johnson, Legal Assurances of
Adequate Flows of Fresh Water into Texas Bays and Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity
Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 609 (1973) (typical roles of public trust is to assure public rights
and access to areas of "navigation, fishing and other purposes"). Furthermore, section 11.021
states:
The water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing stream, and lake,
and every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico and storm water, flood water, and rainwater
of every natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the state is the
property of the state.
Id. § 11.021(a).
126. See Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong
Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 65 (1982) (environmentalist should not
search for remedies in "exotic common law jungles" such as the public trust doctrine, but
should seek statutory principles for environmental protection). Walston suggests that if the
public trust doctrine is used to protect important environmental resources, it will jeopardize
long established water rights and place restrictions on water use which may result in confusion
and uncertainty about future water supplies thus affecting important economic interests dependent on such water supplies. See id. at 64; cf Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate Flows of
Fresh Water into Texas Bays and Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10 Hous. L.
REV. 598, 623 (1973) (doubtful public trust doctrine will guarantee minimum stream flows
into Texas bays and estuaries without legislative expression giving guidance to courts).
127. See, e.g., Illinois Central RR. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (state may reclaim
rights granted to party under trust principle, but state may pay expenses due to conveyance to
private ownership); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 369 (1983) (under public trust state, retains supervisory powers over navigable waters and underlying beds and may prevent any party from obtaining vested appropriative right
in water harmful to trust interests); City of Berkeley v. Supreme Court, 606 P.2d 362, 373, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327, 338 (1980) (public trust power allows revocation of previously granted rights,
even when normally thought immune from trust doctrine); see also Morrison & Dollahite, The
Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV.
365, 377 (1985) (necessity in many instances demands that appropriations of water be approved despite foreseeable harm to public trusts interests); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 477 (1970)
(public trust allows judicial intervention of governments' exercise over particular resources in
order to restrain governments infringement of public rights to certain traditional uses, such as
"recreation, navigation and fishery").
128. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 5 (1821) (one of earliest American holdings relating to public trust) (court stated that sovereign could not "consistently with the principles of
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public trust doctrine could be employed to serve as a justification for
denying appropriation permits, Texas should expand its application to
provide another avenue of protection for the environment and in29
stream flows. 1

IV.

THE

1985

TEXAS WATER PACKAGE PROVISIONS EXPANDING
PUBLIC INTERESTS IN INSTREAM USES

The Texas Legislature has enacted various legislation in recent
years relating to the protection of instream uses, most notably in the
protection of Texas' bays and estuaries. 13 Most recently, during the
sixty-ninth regular session, lawmakers enacted legislation expanding
upon these same concerns and focusing the Texas Water Commission's attention on other environmental interests.131
The significance of these new statutes has been magnified since
most were conditioned to go into effect only if the Texas Constitution
was amended to provide authority for state water development financing. 132 In November of 1985, the Texas voters amended the Constituthe law or nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute
grant of the waters of the state, divesting citizens of their common right").
129. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727-29, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 364-66 (1983) (public trust doctrine requires duty of state to take into account trust
interests such as preservation of instream values when planning and allocating water resources). California has extended trust principles for over a decade to include wildlife habitat
and environmental preservation. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790,
796 (1971) (public recognition of environmental values requires application of trust principles
for preservation of food habitats and ecological areas with scenic qualities). For a comprehensive study of Texas public trust doctrine and needed expansion of trust principles in water
management, see Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of
Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 365 (1985).
130. See TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 1.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Water Code policy to
provide proper ecological environment for Texas bays and estuaries); id. § 11.147 (outlines
water commission's considerations when examining permits which effect bays and estuaries
and instream uses).
131. See id. § 11.147 (commission must consider effects of all new permits on existing
instream uses, water quality and fish and wildlife habitats); id. § 11.149 (applicants who wish
to appropriate 5000 acre feet of water per year may be required to mitigate any adverse impacts that appropriation may have on fish and wildlife habitats); id. § 11.150 (commission
must assess effects of any permit they issue on water quality of the state).
132. See Act of Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 133, § 6.05, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 726 (Vernon)
(Act takes effect only upon adoption of constitutional amendment proposed by H.J.R. No. 6,
Sections 1 and 2 during 69th Regular Session, 1985); see also Tex. H. J. Res. 6, 69th Leg., 1985
Tex. Sess. Laws Serv. A-100 (Vernon) (resolution proposes constitutional amendment authorizing 980 million dollars in water development bonds for Texas). On November 5, 1985 the
voters of Texas adopted the proposed constitutional amendment.
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tion to authorize the state to issue 980 million dollars in Texas water
3
development bonds, thus effectuating all conditioned provisions.1
The bonds will allow Texas to pursue its constitutional policy of encouraging the funding and development of dams and reservoirs in order to enhance the public water supplies.1 34 Whether the legislation
has adequately addressed the importance of instream flow protection
is subject, however, to serious doubt. 3 5 The legislation may have
identified the need for instream flow protection, but it lacks the definitive guidelines necessary for requiring judicial or administrative pro1 36
tection of public interests and strict minimum flow maintenance.
General guidelines in the Texas Water Code section 1.003 declare
that it is the policy of the state "to provide for the conservation and
development of the state's natural resources."'' 37 The policy considerations include "the conservation and development of [Texas'] forests' 3 ... and maintenance of a proper ecological environment of the
bays and estuaries and the health of related living marine resources." 139 Conspiciously absent from the statement of purposes is
that of the protection of "fish and wildlife habitats" other than those

133. See TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 49-d-2, 49-d-5 (1985) (allows issuance of bonds for
water development fund); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 49-d (1962, amended 1985) (provides for
acquisition and development of reservoirs, treatment facilities for water and waste water, and
financing of these projects); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 50-d (1984, amended 1985) (allows 200
million dollars to be deposited in agricultural water conservation fund when bonds are sold
and proceeds are collected). The constitutional provisions also provide that if the legislature
wishes to enact enabling legislation to effectuate these provisions, they will not be void because
of their anticipatory nature. See id. § 49-d.
134. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 49-d (1962, amended 1985) (policy of the state is to
encourage development of dam and reservoir sites to hold water in trust for public). A long
drought, ending in 1957, promoted the adoption of this amendment because of the effects
future droughts may have on Texas economy which was growing. See id. § 49-d, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).
135. See Press Statement of Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter, at 3 (Sept. 9, 1985) (National
Audubon Society and Texas Committee on Natural Resources oppose water package because
not environmentally sensitive).
136. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147(c)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Water
Commission must consider importance of other beneficial uses which are declared higher than
instream uses) with WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.03.247 (West Supp. 1986) (minimum flow
levels have been adopted in many streams of Washington, and all permits issued for appropriation must be conditioned to protect those levels) (emphasis added).
137. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 1.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (general provisions relating to state policy with respect to Texas' water).
138. See id. § 1.003(4).
139. See id. § 1.003(6).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss4/7

32

Johnston: Environmental Significance of Instream Flows.

1986]

COMMENT

1329

related to the bays and estuaries. I' Expressed provision for only one
environmental purpose suggests a construction of the Water Code
which excludes other important environmental concerns, 14 1 such as
recreation or aesthetic concerns.
Although not stated in the purposes of the Water Code, 142 the
Texas Water Commission, pursuant to the constitutional amendments
in November, 1985,143 has new public interests directives which may
well guarantee future instream needs of Texas' bays and estuaries and
may also provide for consideration of other natural wildlife habitats. 144 Under chapter 11 of the Water Code, the commission is
charged with finding that no appropriation is "detrimental to the public welfare," 145 and in so doing the commission is to "assess the effects, if any, of the issuance of a permit on the bays and estuaries of
Texas." 146 This section lists several factors which the Commission
must consider: 147 (1) the need for seasonal freshwater inflows which

140. Compare id. § 1.003 (only environmental interests which are mentioned in state policy declarations are "forests" and "bays and estuaries" and "related living marine resources")
with CAL. PUB. REs. CODE ANN. § 21000 (Deering 1976) (policy declarations state that all
state agencies must give "major consideration" to preventing environmental damage which
may be caused by state action).
141. Cf Hunter v. Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981) (courts will not add
words to statutes unless it is necessary to effectuate legislature's true intent). The Hunter court
was interpreting language found in the Texas Business Corporations Act and found that a
remedy for pre-dissolution claims existed under the statutes, but no similar provision encompassed post-dissolution claims. See id. at 552. The court noted that the exclusion of the provision was very significant to show legislative intent because it could have easily been included.
See id. at 552. Since the provision was not included, it was ignored. See id. at 552; see also
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) (words used in statute
are presumed to be used for a purpose and those words excluded are presumed to be excluded
for a purpose, and only when necessary will additional words be added to gain clear legislative
intent).
142. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 1.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
143. See TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 49-9, 49-d-2 to 49-d-5, 50-d (1985) (provisions relating
to the issuance of water development bonds, on which new provisions of chapter 11 of Texas
Water Code are conditioned) (codifying Tex. H. J. Res. 6, 69th Leg., 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
A-100 (Vernon)); see also Act of Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 133, § 6.05, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 726
(Vernon) (conditioned act only to take effect if constitutional amendment proposed in H.J.R.
No. 6 is adopted).
144. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147 to -. 150 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
145. See id. § 11.134(b)(3)(c) (commission can grant water permit only if unappropriated
water is available, it is for a beneficial use, and "not detrimental to the public welfare...").
146. See id. § 11.147(b) (if permit "to store, take or divert water," commission shall assess effects on Texas' bays and estuaries).
147. See id. § 11.147(c).
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will maintain the salinity levels of Texas' bays and estuaries; 4 8 (2) the
ecology and productivity of each bay and estuary affected; 4 9 (3) the
adverse effects to public welfare of the State of not ensuring beneficial
inflows; 5 ° (4) the quantity of water requested, the proposed use, and
value to others of that proposed use; "' and (5) the adverse effects on
public welfare in denying the permit iri whole or in part. 5 2 Section
11.147 also provides that with any permit to "take, divert or store
water," the commission must consider the effect of issuance upon "existing instream uses and water quality" '53 along with any affects on
"fish and wildlife habitats."' 1 4 These new provisions are legislative
expressions of new public interest considerations for future water
appropriations. 15
These public interests' considerations seem sound considering the
expressed motives of the legislature in the protection of the Texas'
bays and estuaries. 5 6 The statutes specify public welfare interests in
bays and estuaries although other instream uses such as effects on fish
57
and wildlife habitats are addressed but are not further expanded.'
The failure to include further consideration leaves their importance
open to considerable skepticism.' 58 Further, the commission need
only "consider the effects" on instream flows when evaluating appro-

148. See id. § 11.147(c)(1).
149. See id. § 11.147(c)(2).
150. See id. § 11.147(c)(3).
151. See id. § 11.147(c)(4).
152. See id. § 11.147(c)(5).
153. See id. § 11.147(d).
154. See id. § 11.147(e).
155. Cf Johnson Rancho County Water Dist. v. State Water Rights Bd., 45 Cal. Rptr.
589, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (public interest is legislative standards which guide water agencies in making decisions relating to appropriation permits).
156. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 1.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (public policy of state to
conserve water as natural resource and maintain proper ecological environment of bays and
estuaries); cf National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) (national
policy to preserve productivity and enjoyable harmony with our natural environment). See
generally Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerationsin Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 695 (1972) (primary responsibility for implementing policy for
protection of environment rests with "state and local governments").
157. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11. 147(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (when assessing effects of issuance of permits upon bays and estuaries, commission to expressly consider
factors such as effects on public welfare if permit granted or if permit denied) with id.
§§ 11.147 (d), (e) (commission has no expressed factors to be weighed when considering effect
of issuance of permit on "fish and wildlife habitats").
158. See Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. 1980) (when legislature has carefully employed term in one provision, it should not be implied where it is excluded); cf Hunter
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priations, not "assess the effects" as it must in those appropriations
affecting bays and estuaries.1 5 9 Without the more aggressive language
such as "assess," the commission may just as easily "consider," then

ignore. 160

The major obstacle for the protection of instream values found in
section 11.147, will be the section's cross-reference to preference declarations found in section 11.024, which relates to priority of beneficial uses; and section 11.033, which relates to municipalities' powers
of eminant domain. 16 1 When there are competing uses for the same
water, section 11.024 makes "bay and estuary" and "fish and wildlife"
uses very low on the priority list. 162 Under section 11.033, even if a
permit is obtained for instream use, it is subject to the right of any city
or town to take away the appropriations for domestic and municipal
163
uses without compensation.

v. Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981) (provisions that could have been easily provided for, but are not, will not be added unless necessary to effectuate legislative intent).
159. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (must "assess"

bays and estuary effects when commission is contemplating issuance of permit to appropriate)
with id.§§ 11.47(d), (e) (commission to "consider" effects of issuance on instream uses in
existence, along with effects on fish and wildlife habitats); see also Telephone interview with
Ken Kramer, State Capitol Representative, Lone Star Chapter, Sierra Club (Feb. 10, 1986)
("assess" language has been interpreted by Water Commission in past to require action on

commission's part before making decisions).
160. No affirmative steps must be taken in order to "consider effects," it is but a passive
act, while "assessment" imparts duty, activity and is not considered passive.
161. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147(c)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (for purposes of

section 11.147, provisions conserving priority of uses and eminent domain, will be considered
in assessing effects of permits
Land Department, 479 P.2d
application of priority list of
zona court said "the creation

on instream uses and bays and estuaries); see also Jarvis v. State
169, 174 (Ariz. 1970) (Arizona Supreme Court was construing
beneficial uses similar to Texas). In resolving dispute, the Ariof such a priority list clearly evidences a legislative policy that

the needs of agriculture give way to the needs of [higher ranks]." See id. at 174. Suggestion
has been made that absolute application of the statute should give way to being a general
guideline. See Note, Arizona Water Law: The Problem of Instream Appropriationfor Environmental Use by Private Appropriators, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1095, 1120 n.174 (1979) (author attempting to incorporate social utility and need for flexibility by analyzing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 850(A) (1966)).
162. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (as tool in conserving
state water legislature not only effectuated beneficial uses, but required preferences between
uses). State public policy declares preferences in following order:
(1) Domestic... uses ... sustaining human life ... and animals...; (2) industrial uses
.(3) irrigation; (4) mining...; (5) hydoelectric power; (6) navigation; (7) recreation
.and (8) other ... uses."
Id. § 11.024.
163. See id.§ 11.033 (right to take water for domestic and muncipal supply primary and
fundamental and all political subdivisions and government agencies have this eminent domain
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An important part of the public interest considerations in the

Water Code involves the inclusion of the Texas Department of Parks
and Wildlife into the water appropriation process."' The Department of Parks and Wildlife, at their option; may choose to make
themselves a party to any hearing which they deem important to protect wildlife interests. 6 5 This potential intervention is important since
the Parks and Wildlife Department has a recognized duty to the public to protect endangered species 66 and to establish wildlife santuaries
as it deems necessary. 167 It is questionable, however, what affect further participation would have on the department's ability to make ap-

propriations for instream flows since competing uses, as well as senior
16
rights, possess higher priorities than those of fish and wildlife uses.

The new Water Code provisions also authorize incorporation of
power). The state may have a duty to show that the water right being taken away is for
"necessary" and "essential" purposes. See id. § 11.033.
164. See id. § 11.147(f) (Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, may be party to proceedings which they believe important to their environmental interests); see also WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1986) (Department of Fisheries has authority to apply for
appropriation permits with Department of Waters when game agency decides this would be in
best interest of state).
165. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147(f) (Vernon Supp. 1986); see also TEX. PARKS
& WILDLIFE CODE ANN. § 12.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (wildlife department has duties to

make recommendations to water commission to "protect fish and wildlife resources" or be
party in hearings on applications).
166. See TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE ANN. § 68.001 (Vernon 1976) (management of
endangered species require Department to engage in range of activities including "habitat acquisition and improvement"). The department has primary duty to protect the state's fish and
wildlife resources, which includes providing recommendations to Texas Department of Water
Resources relating to instream flows. See id. § 12.0011 (4) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
167. See id. § 81.201 (Vernon 1976) (Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife shall set
aside streams and bodies of water to establish fish sanctuaries); id. § 81.401 (Vernon Supp.
1986) (department may acquire wildlife management areas). The section states: "The Department may acquire, develop, maintain and operate wildlife management areas and may manage,
along sound biological lines, wildlife and fish found on any land the Department has or may
acquire as a wildlife management area"). See id. § 81.401.
168. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (conservation of water
requires priority of rights and preference between competing uses, and uses for fish and wildlife

fall at bottom of list). It has been the law in Texas for many years that "as between appropriations of water, the first in time is the first in right." See Bartely v. Stone, 527 S.W.2d 754, 759
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ refd n.r.e.). It is possible that a prior appropriator
during the drought years may use all the water of his right, depriving subsequent appropriators
altogether. See id. at 759. But the rights of municipalities or political subdivisions to take
water necessary and "essential to domestic and municipal supply purposes" is primary, and
fundamentally takes priority over even senior high priority uses like irrigation. See TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 11.033 (Vernon Supp. 1986). But see In re Water Rights of Cibolo
Creek Watershed of San Antonio River Basin, 568 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
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other state agency activity into determinations on appropriative permits. 169 The Water Code establishes a new Water Development
Board,1 70 which with the help of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, has joint responsibility over the organization of environmental studies and data collections "necessary for water resources
planning and management."1 71 The executive administrator of the
Texas Water Development Board has the duty to "investigate the '172
efTexas.
of
estuaries
and
bays
the
upon
fects of fresh water inflows
This directive resembles legislation from other western states which
requires the compilation of environmental impact statements which
73
assess possible damages to the environment from state activity.

Antonio 1978, no writ) (vested water rights may not be taken through eminent domain proceedings without compensation).
169. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.149 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas Parks and
Wildlife and "Department" [sic] have joint responsibility in "collection" of "bay and estuary
data" and "establishment of bays and estuaries councils"). Section 11. 149 establishes an advisory council which are made up of representatives from "Parks and Wildlife Department,
Texas Department of Health, General Land Office" and various representatives of conservation, environmental, hunting, and fishing organizations. See id. § 11.149(b). The executive
administrator of the Water Development Board has duty to make investigations and studies
concerning water resources, and especially "effects of freshwater inflows upon the bays and
estuaries of Texas." See id. § 16.012 (details duties of executive administrator of Texas Water
Development Board).
170. See id. § 6.051.
171. See id. § 11.149. The language of this provision seems erroneous because it uses the
term "department" which is not defined. See id. § 11.001. The term seems to have been used
by mistake since the Texas Department of Water Resources was abolished in September, 1985.
See id. § 5.0121 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (application of sunset act to take effect in September,
1985 unless continued by legislative act). This ambiguity and uncertainty has caused some
confusion in the ordinary operations of the Water Development Board. Telephone conversation with Ken Kramer, State Representative, Lone Star Chapter, Sierra Club (Feb. 10, 1986).
172. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.012 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
173. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. REV. CODE § 21100 (Deering Supp. 1986) (every state agency,
board, and commission must include environmental impact statement in any report which
affects environment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201 (Supp. 1985) (all agencies should include
with reports on agency actions, environmental impact statements, to assess agencies impact on
environment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030 (1983) (when agency activity affects
environmental concerns, agencies' responsibility to report on environmental impacts). State
interpretations of this legislation require all state agencies to assess environmental impacts and
make reports. See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d
1049, 1054, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 766 (1972) (environmental quality act of California requires
government agencies to make environmental impact report if their actions might affect environment); Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Bd. of Natural Resources and Conservation of State
of Mont., 648 P.2d 734, 744 (Mont. 1982) (function of environmental impact statement allows
environment reports on potential impacts that state's action may have); Noel v. Cole, 655 P.2d
245, 248-49 (Wash. 1982) (environmental impact statement will be required when effect of
administrative action on environment so agency may have full knowledge of facts).
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Unlike other jurisdictions, Texas has unfortunately found it necessary
to focus only on its bays and estuaries with very little significance
placed on other fish and wildlife habitats. 7 4 For proper consideration
of all impact uses and for the preservation of adequate instream flow
be charged with examining the impact
needs, the commission should
75
well.'
as
habitats
other
on
The new provisions also provide for the reservation and automatic
appropriation of water to the Parks and Wildlife Department from
dams and reservoirs constructed with state funds that are within "200
river miles" on the coast line. 176 The Parks and Wildlife Department
will receive five percent of "annual firm yield . . .for use to make
releases to bays and estuaries and for instream uses."' 17 7 Although the
Parks and Wildlife Department holds the rights to use this reserved
water, the department shares responsibility with the Water Development Board for the actual determination of the reserved waters' release and use."' These new provisions do not provide for the Parks
and Wildlife Department to authorize additional appropriations if
needed for instream uses 7 9 and doubt has been expressed if five percent will realistically be enough.18 0 Furthermore, the statute only applies to those water projects started after September of 1985.181 This
time limitation restricts available reserved water for instream use assignment. 8 2 The Water Code provides for these appropriations with-

174. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.149 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (data compilation and
environmental studies to concentrate on "bay and estuary data collection program"). The
advisory councils will include representatives of river authorities on reclamation districts only
from those areas where their respective operations "in river basins or watersheds contributing
to the bay or estuary." See id. § 11.149.
175. See National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1977) (Congress authorizes all agencies of federal government to include environmental impact studies
with any proposal affecting quality of environment).
176. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.1331 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
177. See id. § 16.1331.
178. See id. § 16.133 l(b) (management of appropriated and reserved waters is joint responsibility of Parks and Wildlife Department and Water Development Board).
179. See id. § 16.1331 (Parks and Wildlife must adopt all rules necessary for managing
water and releasing it for bays and estuaries and other instream uses).
180. See Press Release from Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter, at 2 (January 21, 1985)
(Sierra Club claims 5% of water from reservoirs built by state funds will not be sufficient to
provide needed water to bays and estuaries).
181. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.133(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
182. See Press Release from Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter, at 2 (January 2, 1985) (requirement for reservation of water for instream uses would effect few reservoirs in Texas).
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the water
out actual diversion or a diversion requirement' 8 3 although
18 4
may be subject to future domestic or municipal use.
The Water Code provisions go far in defining public interest requirements for the bays and estuaries but they do not define necessary

public interest requirements for other instream needs.' 5 Since the
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department has taken a more predominant
role within the water appropriation process, an improved and genuine
interest in environmental protection with respect to instream flows
may be possible. 86 Who, however, will guarantee this protection
without expressed statutes requiring it? 8 7 The Texas Parks and
Wildlife Department must have the authority to appropriate and reserve additional water for needs outside the bays and estuary system
without the burden of competing with higher beneficial uses.'
The
Texas Legislature should amend the Water Code to provide for this
authority.
There is one new provision which takes some steps that could possibly lead to mitigating damages to the environment if appropriations
183. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.1331(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas Water
Commission is authorized to appropriate 5% of water in selected reservoirs built with state
funds) with Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 524 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (some possession or control of water essential without express statutory authority
to appropriate without diversion).
184. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.033 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (municipalities' rights
to take water which they deem essential is primary and fundamental).
185. Compare id. § 11. 147(c) (commission's assessment of effects on bays and estuaries
requires commission to consider six fundamental factors) with id. § 11.147(d) (Texas Water
Commission will only consider effects on existing instream uses when evaluating application
without explicit factors to weigh).
186. See TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE ANN. §§ 81.401 to -.405 (Vernon Supp. 1986)
(Parks and Wildlife Department may acquire and develop wildlife areas along solid biological
lines). Many western states allow state agencies whose interest lies in wildlife conservation to
make appropriations for instream uses. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
Colorado River Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1979) (Board able to make
substantial appropriations to protect instream uses); McClellan v. Jantzen, 547 P.2d 494, 496
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (Arizona Water Rights Agency authorized to appropriate waters stored
in reservoirs to Fish and Game Departmentt for benefit of wildlife and recreation); State Dep't
of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928 (Idaho 1974) (state law authorizes appropriation to Department of Parks for instream uses without diversion).
187. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.002(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas does not
expressly allow Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife authority to apply for water permits
in order to obtain adequate flow for instream uses such as wildlife protection). But see IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 42-1501 to -1505 (Supp. 1985) (Water Resources Board has been granted express authority to make appropriations and grant permits for minimum instream flows).
188. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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do indeed damage wildlife habitats. 18 9 Section 11.149 requires the
commission to "assess effects of appropriations of more than 5000
acre-feet per year, on fish and wildlife habitats and may require the
applicant to take reasonable actions to mitigate adverse impacts on
such habitats." 19° Clearly this is a legislative mandate for some consideration, but the criteria for mitigation is not specified and offers no
guidance for the courts.' 9' The language of "may require.., actions"
has permissive undertones and may defeat any actual requirement for
92
mitigation. 1
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXPANDING THE EXISTING WATER
CODE TO ENSURE MINIMUM FLOW PROTECTIONS AND
PRESERVE TEXAS' IMPORTANT NATURAL
ENVIRONMENTS

If Texas truly desires to protect instream flows and the important
environmental interests dependent upon minimum flows in streams
and rivers, the state must take more direct and affirmative action to
secure those needs. ' 3 The 1985 legislation and the existing body of
law justifying instream uses must be augmented to remove the doubts
and uncertainties that remain. '91 The following suggestions would
clarify the power of the Texas Water Commission with respect to
public interest requirements and protection of instream uses for these
interests.

189. See id. § 11.149 (mitigation may be required by applications which consider appropriations of more than 5000 acre feet).
190. See id. § 11.149.
191. See Analysis of Sierra Club Proposed Alternative to the "Bays and Estuaries/Instream Uses" provisions in the Water Package (HB2, SB138) Sierra Club, Lone Star
Chapter, at 1 (Jan. 17, 1985) (alternative proposals from Sierra Club would require Water
Commission to mitigate adverse effects on existing instream uses rather than present language
which might provide alternative to mitigation).
192. See id. at 1 (Sierra Club wants permissive language of "may require" changed to
"shall require" in order to guarantee mitigation).
193. See Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter, State CapitolReport, at 1 (May 10, 1985) (serious questions remain whether water package will be sufficient to protect "bays and estuaries
and fish and wildlife" habitats).
194. See Press Release, Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter, at 4 (Sept. 9, 1985) (analyzes
water package as glass "half filled," requiring legislature to take additional steps for instream
protection).
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Administrative Denials or Reservations of Water
for Instream Uses

The new Water Code provisions should be redrafted in order to
eradicate all permissive language relating to denial and conditioning
of permits affecting instream uses and protection of fish and wildlife
habitats. 95 It should be the affirmative duty of the Texas Water
Commission to assess effects of permits on all important instream
needs 96 and require that these needs be protected or damage be
mitigated.' 9 7
The legislature should define wildlife preservation, bays and estuaries maintenance, and aesthetic beauty as beneficial uses having a
higher priority among other uses, 198 thereby giving the commission
more effective means of environmental protection.1 99 At the very
least, the commission should be required to condition permits to pro-

195. See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.147(d), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas
Water Commission shall "consider the effects, if any" of appropriations on instream uses and
fish and wildlife habitats without express factors to consider); id. § 11.147(0 (Parks and Wildlife Department may be party to hearing, when issuance of permit will effect instream uses, "at
their option"); id § 11.149 (Texas Water Commission "may require" appropriation applicant
to mitigate adverse effects of permit issuance on"fish and wildlife habitats"). But see KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-703b (1984) (all new appropriation permits subject to minimum stream flow
required by state).
196. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (commission
must assess effects on permit issuance on bay and estuary inflows) with id. §§ 11.147(d), (e)
(commission need only consider effects, if any, when issuance of permit impacts existing instream uses or fish and wildlife habitats).
197. See id. § 11.149 (Texas Water Commission "may require" applicant for appropriation permit to take reasonable steps to mitigate any adverse impacts on environment).
198. Cf CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253-57 (Deering 1977) (Water Board responsibility
when determining best use between applications, California has more flexible guideline for
determining which use will best benefit public interest); see also Temescal Water Co. v. Dep't
of Public Works, 280 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1955) (Department of Public Works has broad discretion
in determining whether issuance of permit will best serve public interest). In Texas, the Texas
Water Commission must give preference to applications according to statutory order of beneficial uses. See White, Opportunitiesfor Protecting Instream Flows in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Arkansas, at 8 (Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sept. 1983). Arizona has same preference list of beneficial uses which has been held a legislative mandate for
considering higher ranked uses first. See Jarvis v. State Land Dep't, 479 P.2d 169, 174 (Ariz.
1970). Arizona's statute requiring preferences has been heavily criticized and should give way
to more general and flexible guidelines. See Note, Arizona Water Law: The Problem of Instream Appropriationfor Environmental Use By Private Appropriators, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1095,
1108 (1979).
199. See White, Opportunitiesfor Protecting Instream Flows in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Arkansas, at 8 (Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sept. 1983) (preferred uses may restrict benefits of protecting instream flows).
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tect stream flows when applications contain alternative sources of
water supply that could be reasonably employed. 200 These safeguards
would ensure environmental protections by forcing the commission to
make findings of the potential detrimental effects on existing water
courses and take affirmative steps to guard against damage. 20 ' By allowing water appropriations specifically for instream uses, additional
legislation augmenting the existing Code would increase the chance of
environmental preservations.2 °2
B.

Appropriative Right Permits for Instream Uses

Texas should expressly authorize the Texas Water Commission to
grant appropriation permits to protect instream flows without the
need for diversion requirement to perfect these rights.20 3 In granting
appropriations for instream uses when unappropriated water is available, perfected and recognized water rights may well preserve minimum flow required for wildlife preservation. 2°
The commission should possess more express authority to grant
permits for instream uses.20 5 This could be implemented easily if in200. See Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107, 123-25 (1911) (water
used for beneficial purposes should give way to other uses, when competing demands and more
efficient means available for meeting those demands).
201. See White, Opportunitiesfor Protecting Instream Flows in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Arkansas, at 8-13 (Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sept. 1983)
(permit conditions will be important and complicated part of minimum instream flow protection in Texas); cf WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.247 (Supp. 1986) (once minimum flow
levels have been recognized "permits shall be conditioned to protect [minimum flows]").
202. See White, Opportunitiesfor Protecting Instream Flows in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Arkansas, at 13 (Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sept. 1983) (added legislation to Texas Water Code can help promote instream uses by allowing appropriations to conservation minded appropriators).
203. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (Supp. 1985) (Colorado Water Conservation
Board granted authority to make instream water appropriations). Most western states give
express authority to water rights agencies to make appropriations for instream uses. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1501 to -1505 (Supp. 1985) (minimum stream flows are beneficial uses and
appropriations may be made to protect them); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2, 108-10, 114-17
(Supp. 1985) (instream appropriations allowed when in public interest to do so); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.03.345 (Supp. 1986) (legislature established appropriation and reservation
mandates to protect minimum flows and levels).
204. See White, Opportunitiesfor Protecting Instream Flows in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Arkansas, at 8-13 (Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sept. 1983)
(permits for instream use helpful for protecting environment and granted permits give notice
to future appropriators that water used and unavailable).
205. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.1331 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas Water Commission may issue permits for 5% of water which reserved for instream uses from reservoirs
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stream or minimum flows maintenance takes a higher position in the
priorities of uses found in the Water Code.20 6 It will be important to
establish the instream use right without the historic diversion requirement since the water must remain within the banks of the stream.2 °7
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department as appropriative right
holder: The legislature should pass provisions which expressly grant
the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department the ability to appropriate
water for instream maintenance in order to effectuate the department's duties as8 custodian of Texas' wildlife 'sanctuaries' and 'endan20
gered species.'
The Texas Parks and Wildlife Department has a genuine interest in
environmental protection and is sensitive to the environmental concerns of Texas. 2°9 The department should be allowed to freely appropriate water if it deems it necessary to protect its concerns and
interest. 2 10 The department needs the authority to acquire water

built with state money which are within 200 river miles of coastline). But see WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.03.345 (Supp. 1986) (legislature has given authority to grant appropriations
to protect minimum flows and does not limit appropriations to any set amount).
206. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (appropriations may be
made for "other beneficial uses" which would include instream use, but other uses such as
irrigation and hydroelectric power are higher priority).
207. See State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928 (Idaho
1974) (beneficial use of water for instream purposes should not require physical diversion of
water). Diversion requirements, when water is used for minimum flow protections, have been
rejected when legislature has abolished it expressly or impliedly. See Tarlock & Rice, Minimum Stream Flow Maintenance, PROCEEDINGS, WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS, § 9, at 8 (1985).
208. See White, Opportunitiesfor Protecting Instream Flows in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Arkansas, at 25-26 (Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sept. 1983)
(Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife should seek appropriative rights in water for maintenance of wildlife sanctuaries). It has been urged that the legislation authorizing 5% reservation of water in coastal reservoirs be redrafted, allowing the Parks and Wildlife Department
ability to appropriate water as it deems necessary. See Press Statement of Sierra Club, Lone
Star Chapter, at 3-4 (Sept. 9, 1985). See generally TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE ANN.
§§ 68.001, 81.201 (Vernon 1976) (establishing authority for wildlife sanctuaries and preservation of endangered species).
209. See TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE ANN. §§ 1.011, 13.002 (Vernon Supp. 1986)
(all wild animals, aquatic animals, beds of public waters are property of people of Texas and
Parks and Wildlife Department may maintain and manage, as well as develop, recreational
resources of state).
210. See MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (Supp. 1985) (Montana authorizes Board
of Natural Resources and Conservation to appropriate water to maintain minimum flow and
reserve large amounts of water for environmental protection). This procedure maintains substantial quantities of water in Yellowstone Basin. See Tarlock, The Recognition ofInstream
Flow Rights: 'New' Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 24-1, 24-36-39
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rights in the same capacity as it has to obtain wildlife sanctuaries or to
protect endangered species. The stronger the preference for instream
uses in the Texas Water Code, the better chance the department has
in effectuating "habitat acquisition and improvement. ' 2 11 If legislative authorization fails to establish adequate protections, the Texas
Parks and Wildlife Department, as custodian of Texas' wildlife environments or other affected parties, may pursue minimum instream
flow through an expanded public trust doctrine.2 12
C.

The Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine has been a useful tool in advancing public
interests in many instances where the state has acted selfishly without
regard to public interests. 213 The Texas courts should recognize and
expand the public trust application beyond navigation, commerce,
and fisheries to include all environmental values as well.2 t 4
If the Water Commission remains strapped to the preferential treat(1979); see also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2, 108 (Supp. 1985) (instream appropriations may only
be granted to Nebraska's "Game and Parks Commission or Natural Resources District").
211. See TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE ANN. § 68.001(2)(B) (Vernon 1976) (general
powers of Parks and Wildlife Department includes wildlife habitat acquisition and mangement). But see TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (preferences in beneficial uses may be implemented when competing uses arise in application process); see also
White, Opportunitiesfor ProtectingInstream Flows in Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, at 8-9
(Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sept. 1983) (Water Commission
of Texas must give preference to uses ranked by priority in Water Code).
212. See Diversion Lake Club v.Health, 126 Tex. 129, 139, 86 S.W.2d 441, 446 (1935)
(permit to irrigate water does not allow interference of public rights in public waters). The
rationale of Diversion Lake Club supports the argument that an appropriative system of water
law does not subsume the public trust doctrine, but that the doctrine is separate and exists with
authority to require the Texas Water Commission to protect public rights in natural resources.
See Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and
Estuaries,37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 406-407 (1985); see also National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 369 (1983) (public trust doctrine and appropriative rights system are integrated, but each has distinct function).
213. See Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas
Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 374 (1985) (courts have used doctrine to invalidate grants of public trust property and as mechanism for enforcing trust obligations of title
holder of trust property).
214. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725-26, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 362-63 (1983) (public trust applications have been expanded beyond navigation,
commerce and fisheries to include protection of riparian fish and wildlife habitats). California
has not felt limited to antiquated notions of trust applications and will apply the trust principles for "preservation of lands in their natural condition" so they may serve as ecological units
for scientific study, for open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
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ment of all beneficial uses over those of recreation and environment,2" 5 the judiciary, with its growing involvement in water rights
policy-making, may be the only alternative for adequate instream protections.21 6 The courts may well be the best arena for effectuating the
balance between private and public rights to water resources.21 7 Public interest groups and citizens, armed with a constitutional mandate
for protection of public rights to natural resources, 218 may turn to the
courts for resolve if the prior appropriation system proves deficient in
protecting the expanded public trusts interest.21 9 Whatever theory is
utilized, affected groups may pursue to guarantee protection of instream uses, it is apparent that more legislative expressions must be
effectuated in order for the courts to resolve any disputes arising between appropriative right holders and those persons wishing to preserve Texas natural habitats. 220 The above recommendations, if taken
to heart, may preserve Texas natural resources for generations to

come.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Appropriative water rights law encompasses many legal justifications for the protection of instream uses such as recreation, fish, and
wildlife habitats, and aesthetic beauty of our great outdoors. These
protections include administrative water rights appropriation, admin-

istrative denial or conditioning of appropriative rights, and the public
215. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
216. See Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d

1085, 1092 (Idaho 1983) (public trust forms outer boundaries at all times of permissible government action related to trust resources).
217. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346, 364 (1983) (pubic interest questions which require balancing of interests and needs in
water rights administration with those of public trust values, and courts must draw from judicial precedent, public trust, water rights system, and expert testimony).
218. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59 (1917) (duty of state legislature to preserve all
Texas natural resources for benefit of pubic).
219. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 477 (1970) (doctrine will allow judiciary to intervene with
government administration which fails to protect public rights to water uses).
220. See Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate Flows of Fresh Water into Texas Bays
and Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10 Hous. L. REV. 598, 623 (1973) (public
trust doctrine acting alone without expressed legislative guidance might not be enough to insure minimum flows); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The
Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 65 (1982) (environmentalist
should not seek remedy in public trust doctrine without statutory principles established for
environmental protection).
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trust doctrine. Unfortunately, Texas has not historically recognized
instream needs. Furthermore, Texas' recent treatment of instream
flows may not be sufficient to ensure instream protection.
Many western states have passed enabling legislation which has
specifically addressed the issues of instream uses and have made advances toward protecting minimum stream flows necessary to protect
natural environments. Texas has enacted legislation which has significantly advanced recognition of public interests in the maintenance of
instream values. The statutes, however, only express the fact that a
problem exists and that the Water Commission and Parks and Wildlife Department must consider effects of appropriations on the
environment.
Administrative policy making will not be the answer to protecting
Texas' instream needs, especially if the powers of the administrative
agencies are statutorily limited. The Texas Legislature must authorize the commission to make instream appropriations in the public interest without the historical limitations. The Parks and Wildlife
Department must be authorized by the state to hold appropriative
rights to instream uses. The Water Commission must be required to
condition future appropriations on minimum flows necessary for environmental maintenance.
If the legislature fails in its duty as trustee of public waters for the
benefit of all citizens, then we must address the judiciary for intervention before the carnage of the appropriative rights system dries up
Texas fish and wildlife habitats. If Texans are to preserve the natural
beauty of Texas' wildlife habitats for generations to come, the legislature will have to address these issues which remain unanswered.
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